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L. Introduction
"Drunk driving will never be eliminated in a society recognizable as our
own."' These are sobering words, especially when recent government data
suggests that drunk driving kills up to one American every forty minutes,
totaling nearly 13,000 fatalities in 2007.2 The faces of the needless dead
remind us that the criminalization of drunk driving is deeply personal.3
Motivated by those most intimately affected by drunk driving,4 and with the
ultimate, albeit unrealistic, goal of completely eliminating drunk drivers from
our highways, the federal government has supported, and the states have
implemented, various enforcement programs aimed at apprehending and, more
importantly, deterring motorists from driving under the influence of alcohol.5
But when an enforcement program necessarily trades Fourth Amendment
liberties for public safety, the courts are left to answer the difficult question: Is
it worth it? Even the most noble enforcement programs must withstand
1. H. LAURENCE Ross, CONFRONTING DRuNic DRIVING 193 (1992).
2. See 60 Minutes: DWlDeaths: Is it Murder? (CBS television broadcast Jan. 4,2009),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/1 2/31/I60minutes/main4694666.shtmi
("Drunk driving kills more than 13,000 Americans a year-that's one every 39 minutes.")
(transcript on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); NAT'L HIGHwAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 810 965, at 1 (2008), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Pubs/810985.PDF (providing that "[uln 2007, 12,998 people were killed in alcohol-impaired-
driving crashes," which "represent[s] an average of one alcohol-impaired-driving fatality every
40 minutes"). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) defines "alcohol-
impaired-driving fatalities" as "fatalities that occur in motor vehicle traffic crashes that involve
at least one driver or a motorcycle rider (operator) with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of
.08 grams per deciliter or above." Id. at 7. Note, however, that "[t]he term 'alcohol-impaired'
does not indicate that a crash or a fatality was caused by alcohol impairment." Id. at 1.
3. See, e.g., 60 Minutes, supra note 2 (reporting on the murder conviction of Martin
Heidgen, who drove for miles-the wrong way-down a parkway with "a blood alcohol content
over three times the legal limit" and crashed into an oncoming vehicle, killing the driver and
beheading a seven-year-old girl); GERALD D. ROBIN, WAGING THE BATTLE AGAINST DRuNK
DRIVING 9-10 (1991) (stating why Candy Lightner launched Mothers Against Drunk Driving
(MADD)--her thirteen-year-old daughter was the fatal victim of a hit-and-run drunk driver).
4. See, e.g., ROBIN, supra note 3, at 10 ("MADD ha[s] become the driving force behind
the movement to reform drunk driving laws, to encourage societal intolerance of drunk drivers,
and to alter the benign attitudes of prosecutors and judges toward the offense and the
offenders.").
5. See, e.g., Jack Stuster, Creating Impaired Driving General Deterrence: Eight Case
Studies of Sustained, High- Visibility, Impaired-Driving Enforcement, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADmiN., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 809 950, at 1 (2006) (presenting a comprehensive report




constitutional scrutiny. This Note focuses on one program that is no stranger to
the legal and social discourse: the sobriety checkpoint.6
Sobriety checkpoints are unique among the various anti-drinking and
driving enforcement procedures mainly because police officers may conduct
sobriety checkpoint stops, unlike most other vehicle stops, without
individualized suspicion.7 Contrast, for example, the traditional roving patrol
stop.8 A roving patrol officer has authority to stop a motorist when the officer
observes articulable facts and objective indicia of impairment. 9 Roving patrol
officers observe drivers for signs of alcohol impairment-whether on the faces
of oncoming drivers or as exhibited by erratic driving behavior.' 0 Dr. Jack
Stuster, in a report for the Transportation Research Board, analogized sobriety
checkpoint stops and roving patrol stops with fishing strategies:
[L]obster fishermen, crab trappers, and most gillnetters deploy their gear in
locations known to be inhabited by the target species, in much the same
way that checkpoints are set up at locations known for DWI [driving while
intoxicated] arrests or alcohol-involved crashes. In contrast, some
fishermen adopt a hunting strategy by searching for indicators of fish by
both visual and technical means, then pursuing their prey, in the same
6. This Note refers to sobriety checkpoints generally throughout. Still, the reader should
understand that the specific sobriety checkpoint at issue is comparable to the sobriety
checkpoint at issue in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). See
also Traffic Safety Facts, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAmc SAFETY ADMIN., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 8 10
881W, at 1 (2008) ("NHTSA defines a sobriety checkpoint as the stopping of vehicles, or a
specific sequence of vehicles (i.e., every fifth vehicle), at a predetermined fixed location to
detect drivers who are impaired by alcohol or other drugs.").
7. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 458 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing the sobriety checkpoint as "a program that subjects the general public to
suspicionless seizures").
8. See Jack W. Stuster, Increasing the Opportunities to Examine Impaired Drivers, in
TRtANsp. REs. Stuster No. E-C020, at D-1, D-3 (2000), available at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/circulars/ec020.pdf ("Most special DWI [Driving While
Intoxicated] enforcement consists of roving patrols ... in which officers concentrate their
efforts on detecting and processing DWI motorists.").
9. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,884 (1975) ("[O]fficers on
roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that. ... [criminal activity
is afoot]."); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("As a general matter,
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation has occurred.").
10. See Stuster, supra note 8, at D-3 ("Experienced officers usually inspect the faces of
oncoming drivers for the signs of alcohol impairment, in addition to evaluating driving
performance from behind.").
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manner that roving patrol officers search for, then stop, motorists who
exhibit DWI cues.
To expand the analogy further, these fishers aim to deplete entirely a certain
fish stock from their waters-namely, drunk fish. Unlike a trap, however, the
sobriety checkpoint operates to scare drunk fish out of the water.'12 In other
words, a successful sobriety checkpoint, although designed like a trap to catch
drunk fish, will eventually catch no drunk fish at all because the trap scared all
the drunk fish away.'13 The fishers get skunked in a good way when there are
no more drunk fish in the sea. When the trap neither catches nor scares the
drunk fish away, however, the fishers are just plain getting skunked.
Unlike fish, motorists have Fourth Amendment protections-whether
drunk or not. The Supreme Court, therefore, reviewed a Fourth Amendment
challenge to suspicionless sobriety checkpoint stops in Michigan Department of
State Police v. SitZ. 14 In Sitz, the Court reviewed the reasonableness of "the
initial [suspicionless] stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and
the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint
officers."'15 Sitz, therefore, is a battle won for reasonableness advocates in the
broader reasonableness versus warrant preference war over Fourth Amendment
interpretation.'16  With reasonableness alone at issue, the Court set out to
balance the competing interests and a majority sided with the government.'1
7
But the reasonableness standard is a nebulous standard, open to varied
interpretation. This Note proposes a more accurate examination of sobriety
checkpoint reasonableness. This Note argues that Sitz granted too much blind
deference to "politically accountable officials,"'18 and, with almost nineteen
years of post-Sitz hindsight, attempts to provide a better understanding of
sobriety checkpoint reasonableness by using empirical research and
fundamental economic principles. In doing so, this Note predicts a point in
time when sobriety checkpoints are unreasonable under any reasonableness
11. Id atD-l2to-13.
12. See infra Part III.B (articulating the sobriety checkpoint's role as a deterrent).
13. See Stuster, supra note 8, at D- 13 ("[A] declining arrest rate is a measure of a
checkpoint program's deterrence on drivers.").
14. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (holding that
temporary roadside sobriety checkpoints are not per se unconstitutional).
15. Idat450-5 1.
16. See infra Parts II.A-B (articulating the warrant preference and reasonableness
approaches to Fourth Amendment interpretation).
17. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450 (citing the balancing test from Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47
(1979), as the applicable standard of review).
18. Id. at 453.
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standard-when sobriety checkpoints are irrational.'9 Lastly, this Note offers a
response to recent scholarship taking a normative position on how the Supreme
Court should act to enhance and legitimize, rather than merely allow, use of
sobriety checkpoints.2
Part II briefs four viewpoints on reasonableness: the warrant preference
approach, the reasonableness approach, the Sitz approach, and the economic
approach. Part Ill applies the economic approach to sobriety checkpoints using
empirical studies and provides a general model to illustrate sobriety checkpoint
utility, and therefore reasonableness, over time. Part IV offers a response to
recent scholarship. Lastly, Part V provides a brief conclusion.
HI. Rational Viewpoints on Unreasonable Seizures
Before modeling the reasonableness of sobriety checkpoints, a basic
understanding of the various perspectives concerning the protections of the
Fourth Amendment is appropriate, even if "orthodox Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is a theoretical mess, full of doctrinal incoherence and
inconsistency."2'1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has
a Reasonableness Clause 2 2 and a Warrant Clause;23 the principal scholarly split
of opinion turns on whether the latter informs the former or whether the two
clauses stand alone.2 Parts ll.A and H.B briefly outline the conflicting
19. See infra Part III.D (illustrating the irrational point).
20. See Shan Patel, Note, Per Se Reasonable Suspicion: Police Authority to Stop Those
Who Flee from Road Checkpoints, 56 DuKE L.J. 1621, 1621 (2007) (arguing "that the Supreme
Court should adopt a bright-line rule that allows police to stop vehicles that attempt to evade
checkpoints").
21. Samuel C. Rickless, The Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,
15 GEO. MASON U. Civ. Rrs. L.J. 261, 261 (2005).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.")
23. See id. ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....)
24. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood
Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 1, 7(2007) ("in
contention is whether the constitutional touchstone is the Reasonableness Clause or the Warrant
Clause and, if the latter, under what circumstances it is legitimate to turn to the Reasonableness
Clause to justify' a search."); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth
Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rnv. 529, 529 (1997) ("A small forest has been pulped by legal scholars debating
whether the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment stand alone, or whether the second Warrant
Clause modifies the first Reasonableness Clause by defining a reasonable search."'). Professor
Rickless explains that, if the Warrant Clause informs the Reasonableness Clause, then the
Fourth Amendment "consists in the application of formal rules deduced from a priori
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viewpoints. Part II.C contrasts the majority and dissenting opinions of Sitz.
Part ll.D introduces law and economics to sobriety checkpoint reasonableness.
A. The Warrant Preference Rule
The traditional warrant preference rule assumes that, because the Warrant
Clause qualifies the Reasonableness Clause, searches and seizures are
presumed unreasonable unless supported by a warrant upon a finding of
probable cause.2 The Court has accepted this view but also has recognized
various exceptions to the general rule.2 One category of exceptions is the
"special needs" exception, which extends to stops conducted pursuant to
sobriety checkpoints.2 As the Court continues to find additional special needs,
foundational principles." Rickless, supra note 21, at 279. If the Reasonableness Clause stands
alone, then the Amendment "favor[s] . .. a pragmatic methodology designed to achieve socially
optimal results on the basis of a 'balancing' of competing interests.' Id
25. See Buffaloe, supra note 24, at 529 ("If the second clause modifies the first, then only
searches supported by a warrant and probable cause are reasonable.'"). But see Craig S. Lerner,
The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 954 (2003) (criticizing the
assumption "that warrantless searches are presumptively [unreasonable and thereby]
unconstitutional"). Professor Arnar identifies this line of thought as "a strict (per se) variant" of
the warrant requirement argument, which "presumes that warrantless searches and seizures are
per se unreasonable." Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L.
Rnv. 757, 762 (1994).
26. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the warrant requirement controls Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence but describing it as "illusory" and "unrecognizable" because
numerous exceptions diminish the requirement); Rickless, supra note 2 1, at 280 ("[T]he Court
has found a number of exceptions, all but one of which it has classified under five main
headings of its own devising: Exigent Circumstances, Special Needs, Diminished Interests,
Consent, and History."). Professor Amar identifies this as "a looser (modified) variant that
concedes the need to craft various common-sense exceptions to a strict warrant rule." Amar,
supra note 25, at 762.
27. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989) ("[Wjhere a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or
some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." (emphasis added)).
Significantly, the respondent in Sitz argued that, to trigger the special needs rule, the
government must "show[] ... some special governmental need 'beyond the normal need' for
criminal law enforcement before a balancing analysis is appropriate." Mich. Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). After quoting the Von Raab passage, the Court,
however, ruled that the Von Raab decision "in no way ... repudiate[d] our prior cases dealing
with police stops of motorists on public highways." Id. at 450. Other legal precedent controlled
740
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broadening the scope of exceptions to the general rule, warrant preference
advocates increasingly voice their dissatisfaction.2 Under the warrant
preference rule, the special needs doctrine is at best a justification for the
infringement of Fourth Amendment rights.29
B. The Reasonableness Approach
Those who presume that the Reasonableness Clause rests on its own
bottom argue that reasonableness, and reasonableness alone, is the dispositive
inquiry.30 They believe that the warrant preference rule is unworkable,
evidenced by the numerous exceptions to the rule;31 they look for support from
the history surrounding the ratification of the Fourth Amendment;32 and they
the inquiry, and the issue, therefore, simply was whether the sobriety checkpoint stops were
"reasonable" pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 450.
Many scholars agree that sobriety checkpoint stops are scrutinized under the special needs
exception. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 25, at 1003-04 (noting that "DUT checkpoints and
airport magnetometer searches are perhaps the classic examples of... special needs searches");
Rickless, supra note 2 1, at 283 (positing that the Court has classified cases involving sobriety
checkpoints "under the rubric of Special Needs").
28. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 25, at 955 n.19 (citing scholarly articles that voice
criticism over the continuous decline of the warrant requirement); John C. Sheldon, Sobriety
Checkpoints, the Rational-Basis Test, and the Law Court, 8 ME. BAR J. 80, 80 (1993)
(intimating that the Court's decision in Sitz is an example of how "the Supreme Court continues
to shrink Fourth Amendment protections"); Buffaloe, supra note 24, at 530-31 ("Th[e] [special
needs] exception is so broad and far-reaching that it is poised to turn the warrant preference rule
on its head.").
29. See Rickless, supra note 2 1, at 283 ("[lt remains unclear why a need's being 'special'
(in the relevant sense) justifies the infringement of Fourth Amendment rights."').
30. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures;
it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are 'unreasonable.' What it explicitly states
regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their
use."'); Amar, supra note 25, at 801 ("The core of the Fourth Amendment ... is neither a
warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness."). Importantly, however, Professor Amar
defines Fourth Amendment reasonableness as a matter of common-sense (tort) reasonableness
and constitutional reasonableness. See Amar, supra note 25, at 80 1-11 (discussing common-
sense (tort) reasonableness and constitutional reasonableness to explore what "makes for a
substantively unreasonable search or seizure" under the Fourth Amendment).
31. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 25, at 955 ("Although the Supreme Court has not tired of
repeating [that warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unconstitutional] . ... the
'warrant requirement[]' . .. is so riddled with exceptions. ... that the presumption in practice
works in exactly the opposite direction."). But see Rickless, supra note 2 1, at 279-80 ("[Tlhere
is nothing inherently problematic about the existence of a large number of exceptions to a given
priciple ... unless the exceptions to it are vaguely defined and poorly delineated.").
32. See, e.g., TEULuiui TAYLoR, Two STuDias iN CoNsTrTuIIoNAL. INIERPRErATIoN 43
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look for support ftrm the literal text of the Fourth Amendment."3 When
reasonableness alone is the dispositive inquiry, they argue, searches and
seizures do not require a minimum standard of probable cause; 34 rather, the
reasonableness inquiry entails a careful balancing of government interest in
conducting the search or seizure against the social cost of allowing the
government to conduct the search or seizure .35 To them, the "special needs"
exception under a warrant preference rule is a roundabout way to reach the
appropriate judicial inquiry: Reasonableness.
C Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
Early in 1986, nineteen officers of the Michigan Department of State
Police conducted a sobriety checkpoint, resulting in 126 stops and two arrests .36
Respondents, as licensed drivers in the State of Michigan, sought declaratory
and injunctive relief the day before the operation of the checkpoint .3 ' After the
case worked its way through the lower courts, the Michigan Court of Appeals
(1969) (positing that the Framers "did not prohibit as unreasonable all searches not covered by
warrants issued in compliance with the second (Wan-ant] clause ... because their prime purpose
was to prohibit the oppressive use of warrants"). Professor Taylor further states: "They took for
granted that arrested persons could be searched without a search warrant, and nothing gave them
cause for worry about warrantless searches." Id.; see also Amar, supra note 25, at 763 (finding
support through examination of early state constitutions for his argument that the Fourth
Amendment did not intend the warrant requirement). Warrant requirement proponents,
however, have supported their position with historical evidence too. See Carol S. Steiker,
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 820, 822-23 (1994) (providing
examples of how warrant requirement scholars "fight fire with fire" by responding to Professor
Amar with the history of the Fourth Amendment to support their position).
33. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 25, at 761 ("The words of the Fourth Amendment really
do mean what they say. They do not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and
seizures. They do not require probable cause for all searches and seizures without warrants.").
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Acevedo).
35. See, e.g., RicHAIRn A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 745 (7th ed. 2007)
(stating that social costs realized by searches and seizures support regulation of searches and
seizures "so that the police do not conduct searches when the social costs exceed the social
benefits").
36. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 4.44,460 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
More accurately, only one driver was arrested pursuant to the checkpoint stop. See id. at 448
(majority opinion) ("Two drivers were detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two was
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who drove through [the
checkpoint] without stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation vehicle and
arrested for driving under the influence.").
37. See id. at 448 (majority opinion) (stating the procedural posture of the case).
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ruled for respondents, and petitioners-the police department-appealed to the
Supreme Court.3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, applied the
reasonableness test from Brown v. TexaS39 and held that sobriety checkpoints
are not per se unconstitutional.4 In Brown, the Court asked "whether appellant
[Brown] was validly convicted for refusing to comply with a policeman's
demand that he identify himself pursuant to a provision of the Texas Penal
Code which makes it a crime to refuse such identification on request."4 1 The
conviction was valid only if the initial stop was lawful.4 In finding the initial
stop unlawful, the Court first asserted that the initial police stop was a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.4 The Court then set out its
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the initial stop:
"Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with
individual liberty.""4 The Court further stated that "the Fourth Amendment
requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that
society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or
that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."'45 The Brown police
could avail themselves of neither "specific, objective facts indicating that
society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual" nor
"ia plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual
officers," tipping the scales in favor of Brown.4
3 8. Id
39. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979) (concluding that the conviction of
appellant for refusing to identify himself to a police officer could not stand 'because the officers
lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal
conduct").
40. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (stating the Sitz holding). Compare supra
note 39 and accompanying text (articulating the Brown balancing test), with Sitz, 496 U.S. at
455 (balancing "the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this
system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon
individual motorists who are briefly stopped").
41. Brown, 443 U.S. at 48.
42. Id. at50-5 1.
43. Idat 50.
44. Id. at 5O-5 1.
45. Id. at 5 1.
46. See id. at 52 ("In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the
balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in
favor of freedom from police interference.").
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Consistent with Brown, Sitz first declared checkpoint stops "seizures,"
thereby placing them within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.4 At this
point, rather than determine whether the Sitz police department could articulate
probable cause or reasonable suspicion-consistent with the warrant preference
rule-for any of the 126 checkpoint stops conducted that morning, and without
expressly declaring the drunk-driving problem a "special needs" exception, the
Court immediately proceeded with the balancing test.4 After weighing the
competing interests, the Court ruled in favor of the state program.4
Both dissenting opinions were alarmed particularly by the majority's easy
dismissal of the individualized reasonable suspicion requirement. 50 To the
dissenting justices, the appropriate judicial inquiry should have begun with the
recognition that any search or seizure conducted without individualized
reasonable suspicion is presumptively unreasonable.5' Justice Brennan argued,
"Only when a seizure is substantially less intrusive than a typical arrest is the
general rule replaced by a balancing test."52 Even though Justice Brennan
"agree[d] with the Court that the initial stop of a car at a roadblock .. , is
sufficiently less intrusive than an arrest,"03 he would have used this finding to
trigger the balancing test rather than to justify conclusively the reasonableness
of checkpoint stops. 54 Put differently, even though the ultimate judicial inquiry
was Brown-balancing, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's judicial
47. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,450 (1990) ("Petitioners concede,
correctly in our view, that a Fourth Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a
checkpoint.").
48. See id at 450-51 (accepting Brown as the correct judicial precedent, stating that the
checkpoint stop is a "seizure" within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, limiting the
discussion to the "use of sobriety checkpoints generally," and then discussing the governmental
interest prong of Brown-balancing).
49. See infra Part III (examining further the competing interests).
50. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('The majority opinion creates
the impression that the Court generally engages in a balancing test in order to determine the
constitutionality of all seizures, or at least those dealing with police stops of motorists on public
highways." (quotations omitted)); id at 473 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The most disturbing
aspect of the Court's decision today is that it appears to give no weight to the citizen's interest
in freedom from suspicionless unannounced investigatory seizures.").
51. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In most cases, the police must possess probable
cause for a seizure to be judged reasonable.").
52. Id (quotations omitted).
5 3. Id.
54. See id ("[The [majority] opinion reads as if the minimal nature of the seizure ends
rather than begins the inquiry into reasonableness."). Justice Brennan emphasized, "[Olne
searches the majority opinion in vain for any acknowledgment that the reason for employing the
balancing test is that the seizure is minimally intrusive." Id
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procedure as deceptive. 5 In the end, Sit produced two dissenting
opinions-rather than two concurring in the judgment opinions-because
both dissenting opinions disagreed with the majority's application of Brown-
balancing, arguing that the scales should have tipped in favor of the
respondent. 5 6
D. The Economics of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment invites economic analysis because the
amendment does not articulate a clear reasonableness standard of its own.
The economic interpretation of the Fourth Amendment does not advance the
warrant preference rule or Sitz-reasonableness. 57 The concerns of a warrant
preference advocate do not necessarily trouble the economist when police
agencies conduct seizures of persons without individualized suspicion.5 The
economic approach, importantly, does not require the issuance of a warrant
from a neutral and detached magistrate upon a showing of probable cause to
render a seizure constitutionally reasonable .59 Further, Fourth Amendment
55. Compare supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (noting Justice Brennan's
criticisms of the majority opinion), with supra Part II.B (noting reasonableness advocates'
criticisms of the warrant requirement). In a way, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
underscores reasonableness advocates' criticism of the various exceptions to the warrant
preference rule. That is, what significance does an exception have if the exception leads to a
reasonableness inquiry? Why can't reasonableness be the starting point if that's where the
Court is going anyway?
56. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,456 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("I agree [with Justice Stevens] that the Court misapplies th[e] [balancing] test by undervaluing
the nature of the intrusion and exaggerating the law enforcement need to use the roadblocks to
prevent drunken driving."). Importantly, the difference of opinion is more fundamental than a
different balancing outcome. The difference reflects different fundamental interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment.
57. Compare supra Parts IILA, II.C (presenting the warrant preference rule and Sitz-
reasonableness), with infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text (p~resenting the economic
approach).
58. Compare supra Part IL.A (stating the warrant preference argument), with infra note 61
and accompanying text (presenting the law and economics argument that minimal searches and
seizures may be justified in the absence of a warrant when the social benefit of detecting a
serious crime outweighs minimal intrusions of privacy).
59. Cf POSNER, supra note 35, at 746-47 (expressing in economic terms the "plain view"
rule and searches relating to investigations of terrorism). The Court recognizes the plain view
doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 375 (1993) ("Under th[e] [plain view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position
from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the
officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant."). Judge
Posner provides the economic rationale behind the plain view doctrine:
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reasonableness to the economist may not require individualized, or even
collective, suspicion.6
The economic approach, then, fits within the general reasonableness
approach from Part 11.13, albeit uniquely, because it considers social benefits
and social costs objectively without according deference to politically
accountable officials .6 ' As applied to sobriety checkpoints, the economist is
more concerned with the efficiency of conducting these suspicionless seizures;
put differently, the economist determines whether sobriety checkpoints
maximize aggregate social utility-whether the governmental decision to
[I]f the police conduct a search or seizure for a proper reason and in the course of it
discover unanticipated evidence of crime, they can use it without any showing of
probable cause or reasonable (or indeed) any [sic] suspicion. The reason, in
economic terms, is that the incremental cost, in invasion of privacy, to the person
searched or seized is zero.
POSNER, supra note 35, at 746. In other words, if the incremental social cost is zero, and the
social benefit of allowing the officer to seize unanticipated evidence of crime in plain view is
greater than zero, the plain view search is reasonable notwithstanding warrant preference
considerations. Id. Regarding terrorist investigations, Judge Posner presents the applicability of
law-and-economics as follows: "[T]he more serious the crime [e.g., terrorist attacks], the less
probable cause the police should need in order to justify a search of a given intrusiveness." Id.
This rationale justifies the suspicionless searches of subway riders' bags in New York City, even
when the New York Police Department "apparently [had] no evidence that an attack was
planned or imminent." Id. at 747.
60. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 35, at 746 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419
(2004), to support the proposition that "[tlhe lower the costs of the search, the fewer anticipated
benefits must be shown to justify it"). In L idster, the Court "upheld against Fourth Amendment
challenge a roadblock that police had set up to stop cars so that the drivers could be asked for
information about a recent hit-and-run accident." Id Judge Posner emphasizes that Lidster is
"important precedent because it divorces searching from suspicion." Id. Judge Posner further
states, "[Lidster] allows surveillance that invades liberty and privacy to be conducted because of
the importance of the information sought, even if it is not sought for use in a potential criminal
proceeding against the people actually under surveillance." Id.
61. See, e.g., id. at 745-47 (applying the Hand Formula to the Fourth Amendment and
speaking generally on its application to roadblocks); Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and
Mere Hunches, 59 VAN'D. L. REv. 407, 463 (2006) (applying the Hand Formula to determine
whether officers have sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a search or seizure). In United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., Judge Learned Hand proposed a formula for determining liability
in an action for negligence known colloquially as the Hand Formula. See United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[flf the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:
i.e., whether B is less than PL."). Judge Posner borrows the Hand Formula and states that "[a]
search (or seizure) is reasonable if the cost of the search in privacy impaired (B) is less than the
probability (P) that without the search the target of the search cannot be convicted or otherwise
rendered harmless. . ... multiplied by the social loss (L) if he eludes punishment." POSNER,
supra note 35, at 746. If the Hand Formula lends guidance to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness determinations, then valuations of the competing interests supported by
empirical data may inform one of the fuiture valuations.
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allocate its limited resources to sobriety checkpoints maximizes aggregate
social benefit in light of social cost. 
62
The economic approach examines social benefits realized by the use of the
sobriety checkpoints, including property damage avoided, personal injuries
avoided, and successful arrests and convictions.6 Contrast this approach with
Sitz-reasonableness, which qualified the meaning of the "effectiveness" prong
set forth in Brown-"the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest"-to require a high degree of deference to government officials.64 The
Court said, "[The] passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from
politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among
reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal
with a serious public danger."'65 The level of deference is significant because
the Court further argued that sobriety checkpoints could satisfy the
effectiveness prong in the absence of supportive empirical data. 6 Again, the
economic approach does not accord deference and looks to empirical data to
support the legitimacy of the sobriety checkpoint.6
The Sitz litigation, however, provided some empirical evidence: The
arrest rate at the Sitz checkpoint was 1 .6%.6 One can draw another distinction
between Sitz-reasonableness and economic reasonableness by examining how
the Court interpreted this statistic and how an economist would interpret this
statistic. The Court compared the arrest rate at the sobriety checkpoint to the
relatively lower arrest rate at an immigration checkpoint at issue in another
case. 69 Because the Court upheld the suspicionless stops at the immigration
62. See infra Part III.A (discussing the government's interest in using sobriety
checkpoints to combat drunk driving).
63. See infra Part IIIB (discussing the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint to reduce
drunk driving). This Note follows the majority of reports provided by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) by measuring the effectiveness of a sobriety checkpoint
by lives saved.
64. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-55 (1990) (disagreeing
with the Michigan Court of Appeals's application of effectiveness review and clarify'ing the
standard derived from Brown).
65. Id at 453.
66. See id. at 454 (comparing this situation with that in Delaware v. Pro use, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), where the Court reviewed no empirical evidence and yet made a decision as to the
reasonableness of the stop).
67. See infra Part IIIB (noting empirical observations).
68. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 ("[A]pproximately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing through
the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. In addition, an expert witness testified at
the trial that experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints
resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped.").
69. See id at 454-55 (comparing the arrest rate from United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
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checkpoint, the Court applied transitive logic to justify upholding the
suspicionless stops at the sobriety checkpoint, arguing: If the arrest rate of the
immigration checkpoint satisfies the Brown effectiveness prong, and the arrest
rate of the immigration checkpoint was less than the arrest rate at the sobriety
checkpoint, then the arrest rate of the sobriety checkpoint satisfies the Brown
effectiveness prong.70 This argument is improper under the economic approach
because the checkpoints may serve different purposes. For example, the
immigration checkpoint may serve only to detect and arrest illegal
immigrants .7' The sobriety checkpoint, as this Note later demonstrates, serves
not only to arrest drunk drivers but, more importantly, to deter drunk driving
generally. 72  The arrest rate at the sobriety checkpoint, therefore, is fairly
inconsequential and does not indicate the checkpoint's effectiveness. The
economist, therefore, narrowly examines how sobriety checkpoints achieve
specific policy goals.
With respect to social cost, the economic approach is far superior to Sitz-
reasonableness because the economic approach at least attempts to value
subjective intrusion. Sitz's inability to value subjective intrusion is the primary
reason why Sit produced two dissenting, rather than two concurring in the
judgment, opinions.7 The economic approach, on the other hand, looks to
public opinion surveys to shed light on a proper valuation of subjective
intrusion.7
With an understanding of the economic approach to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, this Note returns to the variables governing sobriety checkpoint
reasonableness.
428 U.S. 543 (1976), with the arrest rate from the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz).
70. See id. at 455 (reasoning that, when the Martinez-Fuerte record indicated an arrest
rate as low as 0. 12%, there is "no justification for a different conclusion" in Sitz when the Sitz
checkpoint had an arrest rate of "approximately 1.6 percent").
71. The purpose of an immigration checkpoint is beyond the scope of this Note.
72. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the purpose of the sobriety checkpoint).
73. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 456 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court .. . undervalu[es] the nature of the intrusion. ..... "); id. at 462-63
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Cort... undervalues the citizen's interest in freedom from
random, unannounced investigatory seizures, and mistakenly assumes that there is 'virtually no
difference' between a routine stop at a permanent, fixed checkpoint and a surprise stop at a
sobriety checkpoint.").
74. See infra Part IH.C (interpreting public opinion polls).
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III. Sobriety Checkpoint Reasonableness: The Variables
This Note now turns to the three variables that determine whether a
sobriety checkpoint stop is an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment-namely, "the State's interest in preventing drunken
driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that
interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists.",75
A. The State's Interest in Preventing Drunk Driving
1. The State as a Rational Maximizer
The state must have a valid interest in preventing drunk driving. In Sitz,
the Court assumed that this interest was indisputable.7 This Note, however,
examines the assumption through economic principles because its validity
informs why the government chooses sobriety checkpoints as a means to
achieve that end. The discussion, then, begins with the state as a rational
maximizer. First, enforcement agencies-like all governmental agencies-
have limited resources to enforce the law." This is the scarcity axiom and its
premise is undisputed.7
How, then, does the enforcement agency decide to allocate its limited
resources? It is axiomatic under economic theory that individuals are self-
interested rational maximizers79--that is, an individual living in a world "in
75. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 (majority opinion).
76. See id at 451 ("No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem or the States' interest in eradicating it.").
77. See, e.g., id at 454 (noting that government has "limited public resources, including a
finite number of police officers").
78. See, e.g., DAVID W. BAuRS & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
EcoNomics 4 (1992) ("Scarcity in an economic sense means that the item's supply is
sufficiently limited that not enough exists to satisfy' all desires."). It follows that government is
unable to prevent and punish all crime because the requisite public resources to achieve that end
are limited.
79. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 35, at 3-10 (articulating the fundamental concepts of the
nature of economic reasoning). On rational maximization, Judge Posner stated:
[M]an is a rational utility maximizer in all areas of life, not just in his "economic"~
affairs, that is, not only when engaged in buying and selling in explicit markets.
This idea goes back to Jeremy Bentham in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, but received little attention from economists until the work of Gary Becker
in the 1950s and 1960s.
The concept of man as a rational maximizer implies that people respond to
incentives--that if a person's surroundings change in such a way that be could
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which resources are limited in relation to human wants" will allocate her
resources in a way to maximize her satisfaction (i.e. maximize her utility).
80
Whether the state is a rational maximizer is a different question. But if state
action is a function of political decision-making, an analysis of political
decision-making by politicians themselves may provide guidance in answering
the question. This Note takes direction from notable economist Anthony
Downs, who posits that politicians "act solely in order to attain the income,
prestige, and power which come from being in office."01 Further,
"1politicians .. . never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies;
their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per se. They treat
policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends, which they can
reach only by being elected."8 2 Put differently, power, prestige, and income
will not follow unless the politician is elected; politicians are not elected
without votes. Politicians (and their parties), therefore, "treat[] policies merely
as a means toward [maximizing votes]."8
The issue then turns to how policies maximize votes. Individual citizens
cast votes-and the voter's decision for whom to cast a vote necessarily
involves rational maximization." A rational voter votes for whomever "Yields
him the highest utility, ceteris paribus; i.e., he acts to his own greatest
benefit."8 1 Political officials, therefore, in acting for their greatest benefit,
promote policies that advance the highest utility for the majority of citizens
relative to competing politicians' policies.8
increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do so.
Id. at 4.
80. Id. at 3.
81. ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 28 (1957).
82. Id
83. Idat 35.
84. See id at 36 ("[E]ach citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him
with more benefits than any other.').
85. Id. at 36-37.
86. See id. at 52 ("[G]overnment decision-making occurs in a tangled context of economic
optimums and political warfare."). Of course, the term "economic optimums" represents
maximized social utility. Id "Political warfare," on the other hand, reflects that elected
government officials "must take into account [in their decision-making] not only the voters'
utility functions, but also the proposals made by its [political] opponents." Id. (emphasis
added). "Political warfare" does not undercut the premise that considerations of social utility
affect government decision-making. After all, politicians engaged in political warfare are
fighting to maximize votes. Political warfare, however, describes the incremental procedure of
government decision-making-i.e., "we assume that the new[ly] [elected] government makes
only partial alterations in the scheme of government activities inherited from the preceding
administration; it does not recreate the whole scheme." Id. at 53.
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The preceding paragraphs discussed what motivates politicians to
advocate policy-power and prestige. The discussion now turns more
specifically to what motivates elected government officials' decision-making-
how can elected officials retain power and prestige when making decisions to
allocate finite public resources? The prior discussion informs the current one.
Downs argues, "[The] government carries out those acts of spending which
gain the most votes by means of those acts of financing which lose the fewest
votes. In other words, expenditures are increased until the vote-gain of the
marginal dollar spent equals the vote-loss of the marginal dollar financed."87
This is the concept of marginal operations.88 The concept of marginal
operations is more clearly understood through graphical representation. Thus,
when x represents the expenditures allocated along the x-axis, U represents the
votes gained from the expenditure along the y-axis, and p represents when the
marginal dollar spent equals the vote loss of the marginal dollar financed:
U
P x
It is easier to spot point p-the point at which the marginal vote-gain no longer
increases-through a derivative" of the above graphical representation:
87. Idat 52.
8 8. Id
89. See JOHN BERRY ETAL., DicTIONARY OFMATHEMATICS 65 (1999) ("[Tlhe derivative of
a function gives its rate of change or, for a curve, its gradient."). Point p also is known as an
inflection point. See DICTIONARY OF ALGEBRA, ARITHfMETC, AND TIGONOMETRY 141 (Steven
G. Krantz ed., 2001) (defining inflection point as "[a] point on a plane curve at which the curve
switches from being concave to convex, relative to a fixed line").
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U
p x
The derivative clearly illustrates that the marginal utility of expending
additional public resources on a certain governmental program-votes
gained-increases before and decreases after the point p.
With respect to governmental decision-making and drunk driving, the
history of the criminalization of drunk driving and prosecutorial attention
suggest that elected officials still perceive a positive marginal utility in
financing enforcement programs toward that end-i.e., government spending
on drunk driving enforcement programs has not yet reached point p in the
above graphs. Economic theory looks at individual behavior to determine
utility valuations.90 Here, statutory enactments indicate how self-interested
elected legislators value the marginal benefit of drunk driving legislation.
Grass-roots organizations, such as Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID),
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and Students Against Drunk
Driving (SADD), successfully brought the war against drunk driving into the
national spotlight-and legislators reacted.9' Congress, for example, enacted
the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984,9 which threatens to
withhold a certain percentage of federal transportation funding from a state
unless the state increases its lawful minimum drinking age for purchase and
90. See, e.g., BARNES & STOUT, supra note 78, at 5 ("[E]conomists prefer whenever
possible to rely on the individual's behavior as the best measure of the value she attaches to that
good or service.... The economist's assumption that individuals' actual choices reflect their
preferences and values is described as the theory of revealed preferences.").
91. See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, DRuNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at xv-xvii
(1989) (describing the "extraordinary grass roots anti-drunk driving movement" beginning in the
late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s).
92. National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
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public possession of alcohol to at least twenty-one years of age.9 All states
fully complied soon thereafter.94 In 1998, Congress passed the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-2 1 ),95 which pressured the states to move
toward a nation-wide illegal per se blood alcohol concentration (BAG) level of
0.08% or greater, down from 0. 10% or greater. 9 6 The current statute provides
additional federal assistance to states that enforce the 0.08% or greater
standard.9  The states complied again.9  Further, Congress passed the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
93. See id. § 158(a)(1). The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 states, in part,
the following:
The Secretary [of Transportation] shall withhold 10 per centumn of the amount
required to be apportioned to any State under each of sections 1 04(b)(1), 104(b)(3),
and 104(b)(4) of this title on the first day of each fiscal year after the second fiscal
year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which the purchase or public
possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than
twenty-one ears of age is lawful.
Id.
94. See J.H. Hedlund et al., Determine Why There Are Fewer Young Alcohol Impaired
Drivers, NAT'L HIGHwAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD~mI., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 809 348 (2001),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/FewerYoungDrivers/index.htmfftoc (follow
"Appendix" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (providing the effective date of each state's
respective minimum age drinking law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
South Dakota was the last to comply, effective April 1, 1988. See S.D. CODIFIEDLAws § 35-9-
4.1 (2004) ("The South Dakota Legislature enacts chapter 261 of the 1987 Session Laws to raise
the state's minimum drinking age to twenty-one years of age solely under the duress of a
funding sanction imposed by the United States Department of Transportation under 23 U.S.C
§ 158.").
95. Transportation Equity Act for the 21Ist Century (TEA-2 1), Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112
Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
96. See TEA-21 § 1404, 23 U.S.C. § 163(a) (2006) (providing federal grants to states that
have enacted and enforce 0.08% BAC laws). TEA-21 states:
The Secretary [of Transportation] shall make a grant, in accordance with this
section, to any State that has enacted and is enforcing a law that provides that any
person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater while
operating a motor vehicle in the State shall be deemed to have conmmitted a per se
offense of driving while intoxicated (or an equivalent per se offense).
Id.; see also MARGARET C. JASPER, DWI, DUI AND THE LAW 49 (2004) (describing the 0.08%
directive).
97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (quoting the statute).
98. See JASPER, supra note 96, at 115-16 (providing a complete list of illegal BAG levels
by state, including the District of Columbia). Minnesota was the last to move to the 0.08%
standard; Minnesota's illegal per se statute was effective as of August 1, 2005. See MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 169A.20(1) (2006) ("It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical
control of any motor vehicle within this state ... (5) when the person's alcohol concentration at
the time. ... of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or
more. ... .
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Users (SAFETEA-LU) in 2005.99 SAFETEA-LU amended preexisting federal
incentive programs under 23 U.S.C. § 410, providing federal grants to qualified
states if one of two conditions is met: The state is eligible when its alcohol
related fatality rate is at or below 0.5 persons per one-hundred million vehicle
miles traveled.' Alternatively, the state is eligible when it carries out at least
five statutorily defined state "alcohol-impaired driving countermeasures."' 0
The statute then provides eight possible countermeasures that satisfy this
alternative requirement: (1) a checkpoint or saturation patrol program; 102 (2) a
prosecution and adjudication outreach program;' 03 (3) increased testing of BAC
for drivers involved in fatal accidents;" (4) providing stronger sanctions for
high risk drivers;' 05 (5) programs for effective alcohol rehabilitation and DWI
courts;' 6 (6) an underage drinking program; 0 7 (7) administrative license
revocation;' 08 and (8) a self-sustaining impaired driving prevention program. 09
Most states do not meet the first requirement and, therefore, must implement at
least five of the eight listed programs to be eligible for federal grants.no
SAFETEA-LU, therefore, requires additional public resources for sustainability
by increasing the presence of alcohol-impaired driving countermeasures,
including sobriety checkpoints.
99. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 23 U.S.C.).
100. See SAFETEA-LU § 2007(b)(3), 23 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1) (2006) (defining the alcohol
related fatality rate to be the "rate of 0.5 or less per 100,000,000 vehicle miles traveled as of the
date of the grant, as determined by the Secretary using the most recent Fatality Analysis
Reporting System of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration").
101. See id. § 410(b)(2)(C) (requiring at least five state programs for the fiscal year of
2009).
102. Id. § 410(c)(1); see also Stuster, supra note 8, at D-3 (distinguishing roving patrols
from saturation patrols).
103. 23 U.S.C § 410(c)(2).
104. Id. § 410(c)(3).
105. Id. § 410(c)(4).
106. Id. § 410(c)(5).
107. Id. § 410(c)(6).
108. Id. § 410(c)(7). See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194.2 (McKinney 2008) for an
example of an administrative license revocation statute.
109. 23 U.S.C. § 410(c)(8) (2006).
110. See Rajesh Subramanian, State Alcohol Related Fatality Rates, NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 809 830, at 6 (2005), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/cats/listpublications.aspx?Id=C&ShowBy=DocType (follow "State Alcohol-
Related Fatality Rates 2003" hyperlink) (demonstrating that seventeen states had an alcohol-
related fatality rate of 0.50 or less per one-hundred million vehicle miles traveled in 2003).
Figures for the years 2004 to present are currently unavailable.
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These political actions-the National Minimum Age Drinking Act of
1984, TEA-21, and SAFETEA-LU-exhibit continued motivation to expend
more and more public resources on the war against drunk driving. Applying
Downs's theory, then, the legislators who enact these statutes-and the
executives who enforce them-are motivated by the power and prestige of their
positions to make their decisions. These politically accountable authorities
achieve their status by maximizing votes or voter support. Individuals, in turn,
vote for whomever maximizes their own utility. Motivated special interest
groups-RID, MADD, and SADD-have gathered a significant number of
individuals behind their collective mission: Individual happiness (or utility) is
further maximized when legislation and enforcement agencies reduce the harm
caused by drunk driving to zero."' Political officials, therefore, are highly
motivated to promote enforcement programs that maximize their enforcement
capabilities, which may run against Fourth Amendment protections.
If one does not believe that vote-maximization dictates government
interest as a rational maximizer, then one can at least take direction from the
Court. In Sitz, the Court noted that "for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis, the choice among. .. reasonable alternatives remains with the
governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and responsibility
for, limited public resources .... *,1 The language evokes economic theory
and, more specifically, the principles of scarcity and rational-maximization. If
the Court grants broad deference to governmental officials and to their
decision-making with regard to limited public resources, then it is not
unreasonable to assert that the Court assumes, for the limited purposes of
sobriety checkpoint analysis, that governmental officials exercise rational
choice in making their decisions. In other words, the Court would not grant
broad deference to governmental decisions on drunk driving if it had reason to
believe that these governmental decisions were irrational.
This Note has so far articulated a theory of why the government, as a
rational maximizer, is motivated to combat drunk driving. This Note now turns
to why the government chooses sobriety checkpoints in particular as an
enforcement program to combat drunk driving.
Ill1. See, e.g., JASPER, supra note 96, at 35 (citing the N}ITSA for the proposition that
"almost 75% of Americans think penalties for drinking and driving should be more severe"); see
also Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Mission Statement, http://www.madd.org/About-
us/About-us/Mission-Statement.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) ("The mission of MADD is to
stop drunk drving . .. .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990).
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2. Narrowing the Interest
The political decision to promote the use of sobriety checkpoints as an
effective enforcement program is a means to achieve the broader political goal
of governmental decision-makers to fight drunk driving, maximize voter
happiness, and maximize voter support. How, then, does the sobriety
checkpoint maximize individual happiness? The answer depends on the
sobriety checkpoint's ability to remove drunk drivers from the roads and deter
motorists from drinking and driving. To that end, one thing is certain: Even
though sobriety checkpoints are clearly designed to apprehend individuals
driving under the influence of intoxicating substances,"13 sobriety checkpoints
are an inefficient means by which to remove drunk drivers from the road and do
little to advance that governmental interest relative to other enforcement
programs. 114  The government concedes this point.' 15 Not only does the
government concede that sobriety checkpoints do little to advance its interest in
apprehending drunk drivers, the governmnent concedes further that the diversion
of government resources from other drunk driving enforcement programs-
such as directed patrols and saturation patrols-may cause the arrest yield to
decrease. 11 6 If sobriety checkpoints are negligible or even counterproductive to
society's interest in removing drunk drivers from public roads, then the value of
sobriety checkpoints must be a function of the program's ability to prevent
impaired drivers from operating a motor vehicle in the first place.
113. See id at 470 1.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting Michigan's court brief, which
states that "the [sobriety checkpoint] program is . .. clearly designed to apprehend any drunk
drivers who pass through the checkpoint").
114. See id. at 455 (majority opinion) ("[A]pproximately 1.6 percent of the drivers passing
through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment. In addition, an expert witness
testified at the trial that experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety
checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped.").
But see id. at 469 n. 11I (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court refers to an expert's testimony that
the arrest rate is 'around 1 percent,' but a fair reading of the entire testimony of that witness.
together with the other statistical evidence in the record, points to a significantly lower
percentage.").
115. See id. at 470 n. 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing testimony from a Michigan
police official who admitted that the "purpose in effectuating or attempting to effectuate" the
checkpoint at issue was "not to obtain large numbers of arrest [sic] of drunk drivers").
116. See T.J. Zwicker et al., Connecticut's 2003 Impaired-Driving High- Visibility
Enforcement Campaign, NAT'L IGHfwAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADmIN, PUBL'N No. DOT HS 8 10
689. at 30 (2007), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810689.PDF ("Refocusing
law enforcement efforts away from activities such as directed patrols and saturation patrols,
which traditionally yield many more DWI [Driving While Intoxicated] arrests than sobriety




The thrust of the sobriety checkpoint, then, is deterrence-more
specifically, general deterrence.117 After all, "[c]learly, society wants to prevent
dangerous driving.""18 Again, drunk driving places life and property at risk of
harm. The sobriety checkpoint "mobiliz[es] the criminal justice system against
the drunk driver before any harm or specific risks develop or driving violations
occur."' 19 The sobriety checkpoint, therefore, is a preventative strategy.
The effectiveness of a deterrent enforcement program depends on
perceptions of apprehension.120 That is, if an enforcement program increases
perceptions of apprehension, then the deterrent value of the program increases.
Conversely, if an enforcement program has no positive incremental effect on
perceptions of apprehension, then the enforcement program has no deterrent
value. Perceptions of apprehension, in turn, depend on awareness and
perceived risk of apprehension. An enforcement program, obviously enough,
has no deterrent value if no one is aware of its existence or its consequences.
Once an individual is aware of the existence of the program, however, the
program's deterrent value then falls on the individual's perceived risk of
apprehension. The individual perceives some risk or probability of
apprehension, ranging from no risk of apprehension to complete risk of
apprehension. Given that risk, the individual must decide whether to commit
the illegal act and possibly face the consequences of committing the act or not.
The theories of rational choice and expected utility dictate that individual's
decision.12 1
For example, a Texas legislator recently filed a bill that would at least
double the minimum fine of a traffic offense if the driver was using the car
117. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 470 n.13 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[Michigan] said:
'Deterrence and public information are the primary goals of the sobriety checkpoint
program . .. ."'). Justice Stevens further argues that, "[elven if the checkpoint is designed to
produce some arrests, it does not follow that it has been adopted in order to produce arrests, or
that it can be justified on such grounds.' Id In other words, Justice Stevens argues that the
effectiveness of the checkpoint cannot be measured by the arrests it produces; rather, if the
purpose of the checkpoint is to deter, then the effectiveness of the checkpoint must be measured
by its deterrent effect. This Note takes direction from Justice Stevens in Part 11I.13. Others may
describe 'general deterrence," as used in this Note and as referred to in Sitz as "general
prevention." See Ross HOMEL, POLICING AND PUNISHING THE DRINKING DRIVER 30 (1988)
("[G]eneral deterrence is reserved for the fear component of law, and general prevention for the
(usually) long-term educative or habit-forming effects.").
118. JACOBS, supra note 91, at 60.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See, e.g., Stuster, supra note 8, at D-13 ("[T1]o he effective deterrents, checkpoints
must be perceived by the public to substantially increase the probability of detection and arrest
for those driving while impaired.").
121. See, e.g., HomEL, supra note 117, at 31-34 (explaining the theory of expected utility
in a more detailed fashion).
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radio at the time of the offense. 122 Texas police officers commented that the
bill, if it becomes law, would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.' 2 1 If the
enforcement capability is impossible, then the perceived risk of apprehension is
zero and the bill has no deterrent value.' 24 Therefore, assuming Texas citizens
are aware of the bill and its sanctions-not an unreasonable assumption
considering that the introduction of the bill became national news and would,
conceivably, generate more headlines if it becomes law' 2 5-Texans will
nevertheless continue to scan the radio waves while driving because Texans
perceive no risk of apprehension. Now assume that Texas police agencies have
some enforcement capability for the bill. Texan motorists then make a rational
choice to either change the dial when the motorist values the probability of
receiving the sanction less than the value of changing the radio station or
refrain from changing the dial when the motorist values the probability of
receiving the sanction more than the value of changing the radio station.' 26 The
bill would then have deterrent value only to the extent that individual motorists
choose to refrain from changing the radio dial.
Perceptions of apprehension are affected in two ways: through specific
deterrence or general deterrence. First, specific deterrence "aims to deter the
criminal himself (rather than to deter others) from committing further crimes,
by giving him an unpleasant experience he will not want to endure again."127
To be sure, sobriety checkpoints have some value as a specific deterrent. An
individual arrested subsequent to a checkpoint stop, for example, is thereby
deterred from drinking and driving in the future because she does not want to
face arrest again. The number of individuals specifically deterred, however,
depends on the number of individuals arrested; the arrest rate measures the
sobriety checkpoint's value as a specific deterrent. The arrest rate, again, is
122. See H.B. 738, 81st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tex.).
123. See Lindsay Wilcox, Bill: Distracted Drivers, Be-ware, NBC DALLAS-FORT WORTH,
Feb. 2,2009, http://www.nbdfw.coff/newsloca/Bill-Distracted-Drivers-Beware.html?corder--
&pg =1 (last visited Mar. 22,2010) ("Law enforcement officers said they're sure the bill is well-
intentioned, but questioned whether it would be enforceable.") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
124. See, e.g., HOMEL, supra note 117, at 32 ("[Ihf the probability of capture is zero,. .. the
rational individual would definitely commit the crime.").
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting NBC's reporting of the bill).
126. See, e.g., HOMEL, supra note 117, at 32 ("The rational individual maximizes h[er]
expected utility, and hence commits the crime if [expected utility of committing the crime is
greater than her original utility]."o).
127. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRPMINAL LAW 27 (4th ed. 2003). Professor LaFave calls it
particular deterrence but this Note calls it specific deterrence. Id
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insufficient to justify checkpoint stops. The effectiveness of sobriety
checkpoints, therefore, cannot be found through specific deterrence.
General deterrence, then, defines the governmental interest behind
sobriety checkpoints.12 8  Under general deterrence, "the sufferings of the
criminal for the crime [s]he has committed are supposed to deter [or prevent]
others from committing future crimes, lest they suffer the same unfortunate
fate."129 Greater is the sobriety checkpoint's "general deterrent effect on those
passing through the roadblock and on the thousands more who see or hear
reports of them" than its specific deterrent effect on those actually arrested .1
3 0
For example, both drivers and passengers witnessing the enforcement program
firsthand, and those hearing reports of it secondhand, greatly outnumber those
actually arrested. The sobriety checkpoint did not specifically deter the 98.4%
of motorists in Sitz-and potentially even more passengers-who witnessed the
sobriety checkpoint but were not arrested. Rather, the sobriety checkpoint's
purpose was to generally deter those motorists from drinking and driving in the
future because the motorists' perceived risk of apprehension increased.
Secondhand motorists, who learn of the sobriety checkpoint through news
reports or general word-of-mouth, likewise are deterred generally from drinking
and driving. The sobriety checkpoint intends to make motorists think before
they drive-and, as one district attorney appropriately stated, "[a]nything that
makes someone think before they make the bad decision to drink and get
behind the wheel of a car, that's going to be a deterrent."' 
3 1
Note, however, that any enforcement program that makes someone think
negatively about politically accountable authorities will deter those authorities
from implementing the enforcement program in the first place. The state's
interest in preventing drunk driving, then, is not an independent variable within
the Brown-balancing analysis. Rather, government interest in conducting
sobriety checkpoints (G) is a function of both the effectiveness of the
checkpoint in terms of societal value gained (E) and the social costs realized
when the government allocates resources to a sobriety checkpoint program in
terms of societal value lost (C). Put simply:
G =f(E,CQ
128. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 1, at 55 ("The principal opportunity for criminal law to be
effective in reducing drunk driving is, paradoxically, not by affecting the apprehended law
violators, who stand within its power. Rather, it lies in affecting un-apprehended individuals
who are sensitive to the threat, should they behave illegally, they will be punished.").
129. Id at 28 (emphasis added).
130. JACOBS, supra note 91,at 1ll.
131. 60 Minutes, supra note 2 (quoting Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen Rice
(New York)).
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As societal loss (C) increases, government interest in continuing to exact
those social costs from the public (G) decreases; on the other hand, if the
societal loss (C) decreases, then government interest (G) relatively increases.
Similarly, when a police program demonstrates effectiveness (Ey-when the
sobriety checkpoint demonstrates sufficient ability to deter drunk driving and
apprehend drunk drivers-the government interest (G) in continuing the
program increases.
With a working definition of the state's interest in preventing drunk
driving, this Note now turns to the extent to which the sobriety checkpoint can
reasonably be said to advance that interest.
B. The Extent to Which This System Can Reasonably Be Said to Advance
That Interest
1. Empirical Observations
The research on the extent to which the sobriety checkpoint can
reasonably be said to deter drunk driving is, for the most part, inconclusive.1
32
Empirical evidence, however, has produced some general observations from
which this Note takes direction in formulating a model. Sobriety checkpoints
(i) do not reduce the underlying motivation to drink and drive; (ii) do not deter
chronic, much less all, drunk drivers; (iii) have a significant short-term impact
to prevent drunk driving; (iv) need significant publicity and visible police
enforcement to remain effective; and (v) may, if maintained and highly
publicized, result in permanent reductions in drunk driving.
The first general observation derives from the fact that the sobriety
checkpoint is a means to deter. H. Laurence Ross, a notable social scientist,
wrote:
Perhaps the major limit of the deterrent approach to drunk driving lies in its
failure to address the causes of the problem in the socially derived
132. See Jennifer N. Dang, Stat istical Analysis ofAlcohol-Related Driving Trends, 1982-
2005, NAT'L HIGHWAY TitArric SAFETY ADmiN., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 810 942, at 21 (2008),
available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/nhtsa-static-file-downloaderjsp?file=/static
+filesfDOT/NITSA/NCSA/Content/Reports/2008/8 10942.pdf (noting that sobriety checkpoints
can be effective deterrents if adequately publicized, but failing to observe a "statistically
significant association with our dependent variable"). In Dang's study, the dependent variable
is the ratio of drivers involved in a fatal crash with a BAC of 0.08% or above to drivers under a
BAC of 0.08%. Id. at 13. Dang also observed that "the proportion of drivers in fatal crashes-
who had been drinking and had BAC of.08 or higher-decreased from 35 percent in 1982 to 20
percent in 1997 [and leveled off approaching 2005]." Id at 1. Sobriety checkpoints, at least in
Dang's study, demonstrated no correlation with the reduction of alcohol impaired fatal crashes.
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motivation underlying the behavior in question. We attempt to deter
behavior by severing the link between motivation and action. The
motivation to engage in dangerous behavior is countered by a threat of
punishment, but there is no direct attempt to reduce the motivation.
Successful deterrence can be accomplished without knowing or
understanding why people wish to engage in the prohibited behavior, but
alternative approaches attempt to reduce the motivation through
manipulating its social sources. Success in this endeavor requires a correct
understanding of the institutional causes of the problematic behavior. 
133
Sobriety checkpoints only serve as an obstacle between the motivation to drive
drunk and the action of drunk driving. In economic terms, the sobriety
checkpoint does nothing to reduce the individual's wants but rather exists to
influence rational individuals to choose not to drink and drive. The
effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint, therefore, can only be measured by its
ability to dictate rational choice and by the benefits realized from those
decisions.
Second, sobriety checkpoints do not deter chronic, much less all, drunk
drivers. Labeling one as a "chronic drunk driver" requires a classification of
the different types of drunk drivers, a difficult task.'134 Barent F. Landstreet,
then Administrator of the Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Program, classified
drunk drivers into three broad categories: Level 1, "the social drinker",; 35 Level
HI, "the preproblem drinker";'136 and Level HlI, "the problem drinker or chronic
alcoholic." 13 7 The problem drinker or chronic alcoholic, in particular, "has, to
some extent, a positive psychological or physiological addiction to alcohol. He
can no longer be dealt with as a rational individual, as far as his drinking is
concerned." 3 8 Assuming alcoholics need to operate motor vehicles, 3
alcoholism prevents the alcoholic from balancing the cost of drunk driving (i.e.,
133. Ross, supra note 1, at 74.
134. See JACOBS, supra note 91, at 53 (concluding that "[a] substantial portion of drunk
driving offenses is committed by a minority of heavy drinkers and alcohol abusers" but
"[dietermining the precise amount of drunk driving and the precise identity of drunk drivers is
not possible" (emphasis added)).
135. BARENT F. LANDSTREET, THE DRINKING DRIVER 59-60 (1977).
136. Id. at 60.
137. Id
138. Id.
139. This is certainly a rebuttable assumption. Surely some alcoholics have access to
public transportation or other safe rides. Alcoholics with access to alternative methods of
transportation, however, may nevertheless choose to operate a motor vehicle, especially when
the alternative method of transportation is less convenient. This Note assumes that, more likely
than not, alcoholics and non-alcoholics alike have little or no access to public transportation and
need to operate a motor vehicle on occasion.
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definite sanctions if apprehended) against the benefit of drunk driving (i.e.,
travel from point A to point B). The chronic alcoholic, therefore, is an
exception to the theory of rational maximization because the chronic alcoholic
is unable to make a rational choice. This does not mean that the economic
model is flawed. The theory of rational maximization understands that outliers
exist.14 0 Sobriety checkpoints thus have little or no deterrent value with respect
to the chronic drunk driver. 14' On the other hand, sobriety checkpoints retain
value as a method to apprehend chronic drunk drivers so long as the chronic
drunk driver encounters the sobriety checkpoint.
Third, sobriety checkpoints tend to have a short-term deterrent impact on
social drinkers. Australia's experience with its Random Breath Testing (RBT)
program is instructive on this point. Ross Homel, an Australian psychologist,
studied and described the general procedures of the RBT program as follows:
[It] enables police to administer a screening breath test even when they
have no reason to believe that the driver has been drinking.... RBT
always involves arbitrarily selected checkpoints, usually on main roads,
which are varied from day to day and from week to week and are not
announced publicly prior to the RBT operation.... [I]n practice RBT is
concentrated in the evening hours, especially on weekends .... Motorists
passing a checkpoint are pulled over for a breath test in a more or less
haphazard manner, and in principle any driver of a car, motorcycle, or truck
can be asked to take a test, regardless of age, sex, or manner of driving. 142
Further, "[n]o judgment is made by the police as to the likelihood that the
driver has been drinking"143 and "[t]he test is given to all drivers
1tped"4
The procedure of the RBT program differs from the sobriety
checkpoint in Sit so much so that American courts would surely rule their
operation unconstitutional upon a Fourth Amendment challenge.14 5 For
example, the RBT program subjects motorists to a mandatory breath test.
American officers, on the other hand, generally cannot administer breath
tests at sobriety checkpoints without reasonable suspicion to administer the
140. See, e.g., BARNES & STOUT, supra note 78, at 4 ("Economists do not believe that
everyone always acts rationally. People sometimes behave in an apparently self-destructive
fashion.").
14 1. Cf HOMEL, supra note 117, at 225-26 (describing 'dedicated drinking drivers" and
noting the ineffectiveness of heavy penalties to deter their behavior).
142. Id at 105 (emphasis added).





test. 146 The RBT program does not provide the public with advance
publicity of its operation. In America, a number of states will consider
advance publicity as a factor, among other things, to determine
constitutional reasonableness.14 7  The objective of the RBT program,
however, is comparable to the American sobriety checkpoint: to detain
individuals without individualized suspicion for a brief period of time to
detect and deter drunk driving.14 8 Because Australia has greater power to
detect and deter drunk driving,149 a review of the Australian program is
more than instructive if it fails or is deficient in achieving its goal. To that
end, Homel noted a "marked decline in fatal crashes coinciding with the
inauguration of RBT," indicating significant initial success.150 The monthly
mean of fatal crashes prior to the inauguration of RBT was 95.7 persons;
the mean for the forty-eight months after was 76.0 persons, reflecting a
20.6% decline.' 5 ' Homel, however, further observed a "steady upward
movement in the fatal crash statistics" after the post-inauguration low.'1
52
The upward movement is consistent with the theory of deterrence as an
unstable process.153 That is, "deterrence appears to be an unstable process
at the individual level, with peer pressure, lack of exposure to RBT, and
successful drink-driving episodes operating to erode perceptions and
146. See, e.g., People v. Pecora, 473 N.Y.S.2d 320,322 (N.Y. Town Ct. 1984) (concluding
that the police officer had no reasonable suspicion to ask the defendant to submit to a breath
test). The court stated," [M] ere speeding does not automatically create a suspicion that a driver
has been driving iintoxicated.... [T]he officer articulated no other indicia of Defendant's
intoxication. There was no evidence of any combination [of] slurred speech; alcohol on the
breath; labored walking; watery eyes, etc." Id.
147. Compare People v. Banks, 863 P.2d 769, 782 (Cal. 1993) ("[WAle conclude that the
operation of a sobriety checkpoint conducted in the absence of advance publicity, but otherwise
in conformance with [established guidelines] . . .. does not result in an unreasonable seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."), with State v.
Blackburn, 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 211, 215 (Clark County Mun. Ct. 1993) (concluding that the
sobriety checkpoint was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when "the state did not establish that any guidelines for site selection and publicity
were established and followed, or that the seizures were sufficiently time limited" (emphasis
added)).
148. Compare supra note 142 and accompanying text (describing the RBT program), with
Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1990) (describing the sobriety
checkpoint at issue).
149. See Ross, supra note 1, at 71 (describing American checkpoint programs as
"restrained, even timid" as compared to Australian RBT programs).
150. HOMEL, supra note 117, at 119.
15 1. Id.
152. Id. atl119-22.
153. Id. at 244-45.
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behavior patterns built up through earlier exposure to RBT." 114 Sobriety
checkpoints, as a deterrent, likewise exhibit diminishing value over time . 55
Fourth, sobriety checkpoints require significant publicity and visibility for
continued deterrence. Significant publicity and visibility counter the factors
that erode the deterrent value of sobriety checkpoints over time. 15 6 Publicity
and visibility remind motorists of the costs of deciding to drink and drive,
thereby maintaining high levels of perceived risk of apprehension. The RBT
programs in Australia, for example, required millions of dollars of public
resources. 517 The RBT program's publicity even had a "catchy tune ... [to]
ensure[] not only that the message got across but that it was remembered."158
The United States likewise recognizes the value of highly visible sobriety
checkpoints, as evidenced in NHTSA reports.159 The language of federal law-
found in SAFETEA-LU-emphasizes the preference for high visibility
enforcement programs too.'160
Lastly, highly visible and publicized enforcement programs, if maintained,
may result in permanent behavioral changes. Even though the Australian
experience witnessed a post-RBT inauguration increase in the fatality rate, Ross
nevertheless commented in 1992 that RBT "was associated with a significant
and apparently permanent decline in alcohol-related crash fatalities."'16 ' Ross
further contends that "deterrent policies may eventually affect related social
154. Ross, supra note 1, at 70-71 (citations and quotations omitted); see also HOMEL,
supra note 117, at 245 ("If RBT is to have a sustained impact on the road toll, the number of
people being reminded of the operation of RBT must exceed the number lost through ... peer
pressure, lack of exposure to RBT, or successful drink-drive episodes.").
155. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 1, at 71 (noting the short-lived success of checkpoint
programs enforced in Arizona).
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting the "unstable process").
157. See HomEL, supra note 117, at 115 ("More than $1 million was spent on television,
radio, and print advertising over Christmas 1982 and Easter 1983. Since then, many more
millions have been expended."); see also Random Breath Testing Commercial [1983],
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-6jLHGDYiT64 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (displaying a
random breath testing commercial advertised in Australia during the 1980s) (transcript on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. HOMEL, supra note 117, at 115.
159. See, e.g., Stuster, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting on eight enforcement programs that
"share the objective of reducing the incidence of traffic crashes in which alcohol is a factor and
the strategy of conducting highly visible, sustained enforcement activities" (emphasis added)).
160. See SAFETEA-LU § 2007(b)(3), 23 U.S.C. § 410(c)(1) (2006) (providing federal
grants for states that "conduct a series of high visibility, statewide law enforcement campaigns"
(emphasis added)).
161. H. Laurence Ross, The Law and Drunk Driving, 26 LAW AND SocWY Rrv. 219, 222
(1992); see also Ross, supra note 1, at 185 ("The Australian experience suggests that if police
activity is maintained, permanent reductions in drunk driving may occur.").
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norms, countering the incentives people have to drink and drive with external
sanctions of shame and internal one of gul. .'62 Ross may be correct
because Australia continues to conduct RBT programs with an overwhelming
98% approval rating from Australian citizens.163  But it is important to
remember the inherent problems with comparing Australia's RBT programs to
American sobriety checkpoints. Homnel provides insight on this point:
Nothing in the Australian literature encourages the belief that roadblocks or
sobriety checkpoints, without the use of fuill random breath testing, are
capable of delivering a substantial and sustained reduction in alcohol-
related casualty crashes. In this respect, the Australian literature is
consistent with what is known of the effects of sobriety checkpoints in
North America. In addition, however, the Australian literature suggests
equally as strongly thatfull random testing is also not capable of achieving
long-term reductions in casualties unless it is rigorously enforced and
extensively advertised.I16
American sobriety checkpoints cannot use full random breath testing under
current law.'165  Nothing suggests that American sobriety checkpoints are
capable of producing permanent reductions in drunk driving even if the
sobriety checkpoints are rigorously enforced and extensively advertised.
Factors other than deterrent policies may also contribute to permanent
reductions of alcohol-related fatalities.16 6  For example, grass-roots
organizations like MADD may be more accountable for changes in drunk
driving behavior than sobriety checkpoints alone. Accordingly, whether
sobriety checkpoints in America affect social norms in the long run remains an
unknown possibility.
162. Ross, supra note 1, at 3.
163. See Darren Pennay, Community Attitudes to Road Safety: 2008 Survey Report, DEP'r
OF INFRASTRucTuRE, TRANSPORT, REG'L DEv. AND LOCAL GOVT (Austl.) 10 (2008),
available at http://www.infi-astructure.gov.au/roads/safety/publications/2008/pducomm-att_
08.pdf (reporting that 98% of respondents are in total agreement with the policy of random
breath testing of drivers). The report also notes that "[olverall agreement has not fallen below
96% since 1997." Id.
164. Ross Homel, Random Breath Testing and Random Stopping Programs in Australia,
in DIUNKING AND DRIVING: ADvANCES iN RESEARCH AND PREVENTON 159, 192 (R. Jean Wilson
& Robert E. Mann eds., 1990) (emphasis in original and citations omitted).
165. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text (noting the differences between
Australian RBT programs and American sobriety checkpoints, and concluding that the RBT
program could not withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge if used in the United States).
166. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 1, at 140, 140-66 (addressing different factors that may
"reduc[e] injury and sav[e] lives notwithstanding the continued existence of impaired driving,"
including the improvement of traffic patterns, automobile safety technology, life-saving medical
technology, and the elimination of roadside hazards).
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2. Interpreting the Observations
Remember, the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint is a function of its
ability to deter motorists from drinking and driving. The ability to deter
motorists from drinking and driving, in turn, is a function of motorists'
perceived risks of apprehension-the greater the ability of the sobriety
checkpoint to increase perceived risk of apprehension, the greater the utility of
the sobriety checkpoint.
Part uI.B. 1 noted general limitations of sobriety checkpoint utility from
empirical evidence: Sobriety checkpoints have virtually no deterrent value to
the chronic drunk driver, suggesting a utility "ceiling" for effectiveness.
Sobriety checkpoints exhibit great short-term deterrent value. Absent
aggressive publicity and visibility, the deterrent value of the sobriety
checkpoint diminishes over time because external factors-e.g., peer pressure
and successful drunk driving episodes-erode the perceived risk of
apprehension of individual motorists. Sobriety checkpoints may influence
social behavior, suggesting a utility "floor" for effectiveness. The utility floor is
also supported, at the very least, by the visible apprehension of undeterred
chronic drunk drivers.
Consistent with these observations, one could hypothesize a trend of
sobriety checkpoint effectiveness (ET), in terms of utility value (Uover time
(X):
U
The trend illustrates the utility function of sobriety checkpoints over time (x),
with all other variables constant and greater than zero, as follows:
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Alpha (a) represents the relationship that chronic drunk drivers have with
the utility function of sobriety checkpoints such that, as the number of chronic
drunk drivers increases, alpha (a) decreases. A relatively lower alpha (a)
represents a lower utility ceiling and a higher utility floor. For example,
assume scenario one has less chronic drunk drivers than scenario two (a1 > a2).
Scenarios one and two are represented as follows:





Beta (/8) measures the duration of the impact of the sobriety checkpoint
such that a high beta (/B) illustrates a more lasting deterrent effect of the
checkpoint. For example, assume that in scenario one the sobriety checkpoint's
deterrent effect diminishes earlier than in scenario two (,6, </32). Scenarios one




- - - -
x
Mu (pi) represents the extent to which the sobriety checkpoint may
permanently affect behavioral changes such that, as the sobriety checkpoint
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positively affects behavioral change as a deterrent, mu (Pt) increases. A
relatively high mu (pu) represents a greater shift in behavioral change. For
example, assume that in scenario two the sobriety checkpoint has a greater
impact on behavioral change than scenario one (W/4u2). Scenarios one and




This Note does not present these graphs as absolute truths regarding the
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints. Rather, this Note presents the graphs to
illustrate, roughly, empirical observations and the theoretical effects different
variables may have on the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint. With a
working theoretical representation of the extent to which the sobriety
checkpoint advances the government interest in deterring drunk driving, this
Note turns to the degree of intrusion the sobriety checkpoint inflicts upon
motorists.
C The Degree of Intrusion upon Motorists
1. Empirical Observations
Motorists have intangible, albeit limited, liberty interests guaranteed by the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 167 The initial stop and
167. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) ("[T]he central concern of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive
interference by government officials."); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,253 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("[Ajn individual has but a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of his
car.... [Ilts passengers and contents are generally exposed to public view.... [Clars 'are
subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls,' and may be seized
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subsequent questioning conducted pursuant to a sobriety checkpoint is a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 16 8 Motorists, then,
lose utility value in their liberty interest when the government implements an
enforcement program that stops motorists without individualized reasonable
suspicion. 19But valuing liberty interest, much less liberty interest lost, is
extremely difficult.170 The Court in Sitz nevertheless expressed the value of
liberty interest in terms of "objective" and "subjective" intrusions (or costs)
when determining the reasonableness of checkpoint Stops.17 1 This Note will
discuss each in turn.
Courts value objective cost by the degree of procedural safeguards at the
checkpoint-the higher the degree of procedural safeguards, the lower the
degree of objective intrusion upon motorists. 172 The common denominator of
most procedural safeguards is the extent of police discretion. 173 That is, a stop
without individualized suspicion is more likely to be unconstitutional when the
checkpoint officer exercises an unreasonable amount of discretion. 174 The level
of police discretion to render the suspicionless stop unconstitutional is
exceedingly minimal. 175
by the police when necessary to protect public safey. .. ."' (quoting South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976))).
168. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) ("[A] Fourth
Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.").
169. See id. (turning to the issue of Fourth Amendment reasonableness after noting the
checkpoint stop to be a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
170. Cf Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation. A Response to the
Critics, 71 U. CmI. L. REv. 1021, 1052 n. 134 (2004) ("Cost-benefit analysis could, for example,
illustrate the extent to which homeland security regulations constrain civil liberties. Although
quantifying civil liberties is diffi cult, cost-benefit analysis could provide valuable insights in this
area." (emphasis added)).
171. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53 (describing and evaluating "objective" and
"subjective" intrusion).
172. See, e.g., id at 452 (agreeing with the Michigan Court of Appeals's application of
"the 'objective' intrusion, [as] measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the
investigation").
173. See R. Marc Kantrowitz, Annotation, Validity of Police Roadblocks or Checkpoints
for Purpose ofDiscovery ofAlcoholic Intoxication-Post-S itz Cases, 74 A.L.R.5th 319, § 2(a),
at 332-33 (1999) ("The critical factor considered by courts in almost every jurisdiction where
sobriety checkpoints are permissible concerns the amount of discretion exercised by police
officers in the field. .. .)
174. See id at 333 ("If police officers in the field exercise an excessive amount of
discretion, the roadblock will usually be held to have been constitutionally deficient."); see also
People v. Bigger, 771 N.Y.S.2d 826, 830 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2004) ("The sine qua non of a non-
arbitrary procedure for operating a sobriety checkpoint is to eliminate the discretion of the
officers operating that checkpoint as to which cars to stop.").
175. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 679 So.2d 1168. 1170 (Fla. 1996) (finding that written
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Procedures, then, must adequately limit police discretion to justify an
otherwise unreasonable seizure. 176 An objective and neutral guideline for
checkpoint officers to follow is obvious, and often necessary, to limit police
discretion. 17 7 Courts often insist that upper echelon personnel of the police
agency design these guidelines.178 Neutral guidelines detail the sequence in
which officers stop cars.'179 For example, courts favor checkpoint guidelines
that stop every, or every nth, approaching car.'180 Guidelines also determine the
questions to ask motorists at the checkpoint.'18'1 Guidelines further limit police
guidelines fail to limit discretion, and, therefore, do not withstand constitutional challenge,
when written guidelines "fail to specify' vehicle selection procedures, duty assignments,
detention techniques, and procedures for the disposition of vehicles" and, therefore, failed to
limit police discretion").
176. See, e.g., State v. Duarte, 149 P.3d 1027, 1038 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) ("The
elimination of the requirement for individualized suspicion creates the serious concern about
lack of uniformity and need for limitation of discretion.").
177. See, e.g., United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547,559(6th Cir. 1998) ("[un Sitz, the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of having proper guidelines to effectuate that
purpose of detecting and deterring intoxicated drivers without undue police discretion."). The
Sixth Circuit contrasted the objective guidelines accepted by the Supreme Court in Sitz with the
guidelines at issue in Huguenin. Id at 559-60. For example, a Huguenin checkpoint stop
lasted for at least several minutes, whereas the Sitz checkpoint stop lasted for less than a minute.
Id at 560. Further, "defendants were subjected to questioning involving more than a few brief
queries necessary to effectuate the alleged purpose of the checkpoint [to deter drunk driving],
and the scope of the questioning was not 'aimed solely at ascertaining' [intoxication]." Id.
(quoting Maxwell v. City of N.Y., 102 F.3d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit
concluded, "[W]e find the objective intrusion into defendants' privacy was not limited by
appropriate operating procedures, but was unnecessarily high due to the lack of limitation on the
officers'discretion." Id (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 625 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ("As a safeguard
on roadblock practices, courts in Georgia have required that roadblocks be imp lemented by
,supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field.' Elevating the roadblock decision
from the officers in the field to the supervisory level limits the exercise of discretion by the
officers in the field." (quoting LaFontaine v. State, 497 S.E.2d 367, 369 (Ga. 1998))).
179. See, e.g., City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 735 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (N.M. Ct. App.
1987) (listing eight factors courts must consider to determine checkpoint reasonableness,
including restrictions on officer discretion to stop motor vehicles). After Sitz, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals clarified, "The eight [Betancourt] factors impose additional and stricter
guidelines than the balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court in Sitz." State v.
Madalena, 908 P.2d 756, 762 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). The court further stated, "[Wie hold that a
sobriety checkpoint conducted in substantial compliance with the eight Betancourt factors is
constitutional under the New Mexico Constitution." Id.
180. See, e.g., Betancourt, 735 P.2d at 1165 ("Automobiles should not be stopped
randomly. It would be proper to stop every automobile. Alternatively, the procedural plan may
properly include a mathematical selection formula, stopping, for example, every third
automobile.").
181. See, e.g., State v. Duarte, 149 P.3d 1027,1039 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (allowing some
officer deviation from the script and "declin[ing] to fix a deviation from a script of questions as
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discretion by regulating how long the officer may detain individual motorists.182
Courts will consider other objective procedural safeguards that do little to limit
police discretion, including whether the roadblock accounted for, and carried
out, appropriate safety conditions.' 83 Whether the government publicized the
checkpoint program in advance is yet another considerationl.' 8
Courts measure subjective intrusion, on the other hand, by the interference
with motorists' freedom of movement and the resultant inconveniences,
including time wasted and "the generating of concern or even fright on the part
of lawful travelers. 18 5 Many of the objective considerations work to limit
subjective intrusion. For example, when courts disfavor extended checkpoint
detentions, courts protect individual motorists' subjective value of time.
Furthermore, the judicial emphasis on safe conditions and advance publicity as
considerations for constitutional reasonableness limits the element of surprise
that the checkpoint has on individual motorists. 
186
The Court has also defined subjective intrusion by the nature of the stop.
In Sitz, for example, the Court noted its previous distinction of the subjective
intrusion upon motorists at a checkpoint stop from that of a roving patrol stop:
[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less
intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten
motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles
a constitutional infirmity, without contemporaneous inquiry more broadly into the invasiveness
and intrusion of the contact"). The court later clarified its position: "Close questions as to when
the threshold of minimal discretion at DWI roadblocks is reached should be resolved in favor of
privacy, not a broadening of discretion." Id.
182. See, e.g., State v. Blackburn, 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 211, 215 (Clark County Mun. Ct.
1993) (disfavoring a two or five minute stop as opposed to a twenty-five second Sitz stop).
183. See, e.g., Madelina, 908 P.2d at 763 (noting that "orange pylons, special stop signs
and room for a safe-stopping distance before entering the checkpoint area, as well as six police
cars with their lights flashing and a Batmobile to make the roadblock visible" were sufficient
safety conditions to help render the checkpoint reasonable).
184. See, e.g., State v. Barker, 850 P.2d 885, 891 (Kan. 1993) (upholding the validity of
the checkpoint even though "[t]here was no notice to the public at large" and noting that
"[wjhile this [advance notice] is a valid and desirable requirement, its absence does not by itself
vitiate the checklane [checkpoint]").
185. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,452 (1990) (quoting United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)).
186. Id at 453 ("'At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being
stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."' (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558)).
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are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority', and he
is much less liely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."'
The Court, therefore, justified its conclusion on subjective intrusiveness in part
by comparing the sobriety checkpoint stop with a roving patrol stop.
Judicial review is limited to the aforementioned considerations. But
judicial review leaves want for a more searching empirical analysis of public
opinion. Sitz itself demonstrates how a lack of empirical understanding of
subjective intrusion results in a difference of opinion-with the majority
holding the subjective intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint "slight"188 over the
dissenting justices' objections that the majority "undervalues the citizen's
interest in freedom from random, unannounced investigatory seizures.
1 89
Recent scholarship may indicate that the majority was indeed incorrect to
undervalue the citizen's interest in freedom from random, unannounced
investigatory seizures. Whether the Sitz undervaluation should have affected
the ultimate outcome, however, is still unclear.
In 1993, Professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher
undertook an empirical analysis of judicially determined reasonable
expectations of privacy.190 Professors Slobogin and Schumacher surveyed 217
individuals. 19' The study provided each individual with "fifty different search
and seizure scenarios derived primarily from Supreme Court or lower court
cases. "'92 When asked. "to rate, on a scale of 0 to 100, the extent to which they
considered each method [or scenario] 'an invasion of privacy or autonomy,'
with 0 representing 'Not At All Intrusive' and 100 representing 'Extremely
Intrusive,"" 9 3 the respondents provided a mean intrusiveness rating of 46.41 for
"[s]topping drivers at [a] roadblock for 30-second questioning at night."' 94 A
different invasion of privacy also lacking individualized suspicion-" [g]oing
through [a] magnetometer at airport"-yielded an intrusiveness mean rating of
187. Id. (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558); see also supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text (distinguishing sobriety checkpoint stops from roving patrol stops).
188. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 ("[T]he weight bearing on the other scale-the measure of
the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints-is slight.").
189. Id at 462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy andAutonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Perm itted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727, 728 (1993) ("T'his Article reports an
attempt to investigate empirically important aspects of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court.").
191. Id. at 732.
192. Idat 735.
193. Id. at 736.
194. Id. at 738.
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13.47.195 Roadblock stops at night, at least when compared to airport screens,
are seemingly not as "slight" as Sit will have one believe. That is, on a sliding
scale of reasonable suspicion required to conduct the seizure, a mean
reasonable expectation of privacy rating of 46.41 out of 100 suggests that some
degree of individualized suspicion is required.1
96
Nighttime roadblock stops, however, ranked relatively low on the
intrusiveness scale when compared to the other forty-nine scenarios. Nighttime
roadblocks ranked fourteenth out of fifty, from least intrusive to most
intrusive.19 7 Professors Slobogin and Schumacher, observing this relationship,
noted that being stopped at a nighttime roadblock is "in rough congruence with
Court decisions [SitZ]."' 98 An accurate valuation of the degree of subjective
intrusion, therefore, is at best unclear.
One could hypothesize, however, that subjective cost has an inverse
relationship with the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint. In other words,
when the sobriety checkpoint demonstrates the ability to deter drunk driving
through high perceptions of risk of apprehension, motorists then support the
program. Likewise, when the sobriety checkpoint fails to sustain adequate
perceptions of apprehension, motorists then lose faith in the program and
become annoyed with it.
The Australian experience with RBT is again instructive on this point. In
June of 1986, Australian drivers were asked whether they agreed with the
random breath testing of drivers for alcohol content.199 Respondents could
have answered in one of three ways: "[algree with random breath tests,"
"[dlisagree with random breath tests," and "[d]on't know/[clan't say.",
2 00
195. Id.
196. Id. at 757-58 (discussing the "proportionality principle"). Professors Slobogin and
Schumacher articulate the proportionality principle as follows:
[UT]nder the proportionality principle, intrusiveness should normally be the sole
criterion in deciding the substantive issue of how certain we must be that a search
or seizure will be successful before it is allowed: in this context, the level of
"probable cause" the ex ante reviewer must find .. , should be roughly proportional
to the level of intrusiveness associated with the proposed search or seizure.
Id. at 757.
197. Id. at 738. The least intrusive scenario was "[hlooking in foliage in [a] public park."
Id The most intrusive was, not surprisingly, a "[blody cavity search at [the] border." Id. at 739.
198. Id. at 740.
199. See Touche Ross Services Pty, Survey of Community Attitudes: FOPS Road Safety
Research Project, FED. OFFICE OF RoAD SAFETY, DEP'T OF TRANsp. (Austl.) 33-34 (1986),
available at http://www.infiastructure.gov.au/roads/safety/publications/1986/Pdf/comm-att_1.
pdf (reporting on attitudes toward drinking and driving issues, namely RBT).
200. Idat 34.
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Eighty-eight percent of drivers agreed with random breath testing. 20' When
asked whether breath testing for blood alcohol should be taken only for drivers
who seem drunk or whether breath testing is favorable for all drivers, however,
76% of drivers supported random breath tests for all drivers .202 The drop in
support caused the surveyors to note the possibility of "a real preference for
target testing. 2 03 Put differently, the responses indicated a preference for
individualized suspicion before subjecting drivers to breath testing.
Fast-forward to April and May of 2008. Australians were posed the same
question: "Do you agree or do you disagree with the random breath testing of
drivers?"004 This time, however, respondents could have answered in one of
five ways: "[a]gree strongly," "[a]gree somewhat," "[d]isagree somewhat,"
"[d]isagree strongly," and "[d]on't know."2 05  Ninety-eight percent of
Australians agreed with the random breath testing of drivers, with 85% strongly
agreeing and 13% somewhat agreeing. 206 The difference between the 1986
survey and the 2008 survey demonstrated an increase in support for RBT.
If the 1986 respondents would have had the opportunity to "agree
somewhat" and "disagree somewhat" like the 2008 respondents, then perhaps
the current analysis would be different. But the balance of agreement versus
disagreement responses between the surveys is sufficiently similar for the
purposes of this Note. The 2008 survey, unfortunately, did not ask respondents
whether RBT for blood alcohol should be taken only for drivers who seem
drunk or whether RBT is favorable for all drivers. The change in real
preference for target testing, therefore, cannot be assessed. Still, the surveys
demonstrated an overall increase in support for RBT of all drivers between
1986 and 2008.
Now the issue turns to whether a correlation exists between RBT
effectiveness and public support for RBT. Generally, RBT has demonstrated
significant short-term, and possibly long-term, effectiveness and a gain in
public support over time, suggesting a positive correlation. 20 7 The positive
correlation may find additional support in surveys of RBT visibility. Again,
perceptions of risk of apprehension measure the enforcement program's value
as a deterrent, and publicity and visibility, in turn, influence perceptions of risk
201. Id.
202. Id
203. Id at 33.
204. Pennay, supra note 163, at 10.
205. Id
206. Id
207. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text (providing numbers and figures
relating to the effectiveness of RBT).
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of apprehension. 2 08 If visibility affects public support, then effectiveness and
public support of RBT may find a common denominator in visibility.
This hypothesis is consistent with the 2008 survey and with particular
consideration to two Australian states: Victoria and Western Australia. The
2008 survey posed the following questions: "Have you seen police conducting
random breath testing in the last six months?" ;209 if So, "Have you personally
been breath tested in the last six months? 210  Seventy-seven percent of
Victorian respondents reported having seen RBT in operation, 37% of whom
were personally tested.2 On the other hand, 64% of Western Australian
respondents reported having seen RBT in operation (the lowest of all
Australian states and territories), 27% of whom were personally tested.21
Western Australia, relative to the other Australian states, also showed the least
support for RBT in 2008, with 77% of respondents agreeing strongly with
RBT.21 If Western Australians experience the least visible RBT programs in
Australia and demonstrate the least public support for RBT, then it is at least
not unreasonable to suggest that Western Australians do not support RBT as
strongly as other Australians because Western Australians do not perceive RBT
as an effective deterrent.
In summary, the degree of police discretion measures the value of
objective intrusiveness-the more objective and neutral the guidelines, the less
officer discretion, the less objective intrusiveness. Public opinion polls gauge
most accurately the level of subjective intrusion a sobriety checkpoint stop
imposes on individual motorists. Public opinion polls suggest, albeit
inconclusively, that subjective intrusion has an inverse relationship with
sobriety checkpoint effectiveness.
2. Interpreting the Observations
Consistent with the observations in Part III.C. 1, one could hypothesize a
trend of the degree of intrusion (C), in terms of utility value (U), over time (x),
as follows:
208. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing general deterrence).
209. Pennay, supra note 163, at 15.
210. Id








The trend illustrates the utility function of sobriety checkpoints over time (x),
with all other variables constant and greater than zero, as follows:
Or simply:
f (C) = -(f (E)) + 15
The utility function of social cost-f(C)-adds the variable delta ()
which represents the degree of police discretion, such that social cost increases
when delta (65) increases. Assume that the sobriety checkpoint in scenario two
grants checkpoint officers greater discretion than in scenario one (4< '2).









D. A Different Look at Sobriety Checkpoint Balancing
When one plots the effectiveness utility function from Part L11.13.2 and the





Point (xi) is the irrational point. Social benefits outweigh social costs before
point (xi). Social costs outweigh social benefits at all points after point (xi). In
economic terms, the sobriety checkpoint is then irrational, and certainly
unreasonable, at all points after point (xi).
Again, this Note does not offer the graphical illustrations as absolute truths
about sobriety checkpoints. Rather, this Note attempts to use economic
principles to demonstrate that Sitz is not fixed in time. At some point in the
fuiture-possibly not today-sobriety checkpoints may require judicial
reevaluation.
IV A Response to Recent Scholarship
In Sitz, the Court limited its decision to the reasonableness of "only the
initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated
preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers. "2 14 The issue
of whether police may nevertheless chase and detain motorists who exhibit the
apparent intention to avoid the checkpoint but otherwise do not exhibit any
214. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1990).
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articulable traffic infraction remains unanswered by the Court."' 5 This Note
focuses on how ajudicial decision on the latter affects the former. Some states
have resolved the latter issue-but they are split.2 16 Police departments have
responded by issuing checkpoint directives to chase and detain all motorists
who exhibit the apparent intention to avoid the checkpoint .2 The
understanding is that a nondiscriminatory and neutral directive that authorizes
and, more significantly, requires the chase and detain stop of motorists will
survive Fourth Amendment challenges because the directive limits police
discretion .2 18 Again, the states are split on the validity of these directives-with
courts either finding the chase and detain stop necessary for sobriety checkpoint
effectiveness or finding, still, an unconstitutional degree of discretion exercised
by chase and detain officers.21
The state split invited recent scholarship to propose solutions. One Note
in particular, Shan Patel's Per Se Reasonable Suspicion: Police Authority to
Stop Those Who Flee from Road Checkpoints, 2 20 calls for a bright-line judicial
rule-per se reasonable suspicion-to support police authority to conduct chase
215. A chase and detain stop is comparable to a roving patrol stop discussed earlier in this
Note because, generally, both stops require individualized reasonable suspicion.
216. Compare State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 924 (N.C. 2000) ('The purpose of any
checkpoint ... would be defeated if drivers had the option to 'legally avoid,' ignore or
circumvent the checkpoint by either electing to drive through without stopping or by turning
away upon entering the checkpoint's perimeters."), with Commonwealth v. Scavello, 734 A.2d
386, 388 (Pa. 1999) ("Although thr sstatutory authority ... for police to conduct roadblocks,
and although this court to date has declined to rule this practice unconstitutional, . .. there is no
requirement that a driver go through a roadblock. Failing to go through the roadblock ..
provides no basis for police intervention.").
217. See, e.g., State v. Anaya, 185 P.3d 1096, 1098 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd, 217 P.3d
586 (N.M. 2008) (reviewing a checkpoint directive providing that 'vehicles exhibiting an
apparent intention to avoid the checkpoint[] shall be deemed to have generated reasonable
suspicion to be stopped"). The Florida Highway Patrol, however, expressly denied its officers
the authority to stop driver's who attempt to avoid a checkpoint. See FLA. HIGHWAY PATROL,
COMPREHENSIVE ROADSIDE SAFETY CHECKPOINTS, POLICY No. 17.08, at 4 (Sept. 1, 1996),
available at http://www.fhip. state. fl.usfhtmlIManual I 7-08.pdf ("A driver's effort to avoid a
checkpoint is not sufficient to justify the stopping of a vehicle. Probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or other traffic related violations must occur in order to warrant
the stopping of a vehicle.').
218. See, e.g., Anaya, 185 P.3d at 1098 ('The district court concluded that because 'the
plan directs stopping anyone avoiding the checkpoint, it removes the officer discretion that is
problematic with sobriety checkpoints."').
219. Compare id (invalidating a checkpoint directive providing that "vehicles exhibiting
an apparent intention to avoid the checkpoint[] shall be deemed to have generated reasonable
suspicion to be stopped"), with People v. Chaffee, 590 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) (concluding that a "nonarbitrary uniform procedure to stop all motorists .. , who
reasonably appear to be avoiding the checkpoint" is lawful).
220. Patel, supra note 20.
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and detain stops.22 '1 The proposed bright-line rule provides "that a vehicle that
flees from a roadblock necessarily arouses reasonable suspicion. 22  Patel
justifies per se reasonable suspicion chase and detain stops, in part, by arguing
that motorists who successfiully avoid checkpoints undermine the effectiveness
of checkpoints and increase the subjective intrusiveness experienced by
motorists who do not attempt to avoid checkpoints, thereby rendering Sit
checkpoint stops unreasonable. 2 The discussions in Parts U.B. 1 and In. C. 1,
however, suggest that this argument is misguided.




Drive Don't Drive Don't
DriveDrive
Decision 3: f3)1(6)
Avoid Don't Avoid Don't
AvoidAvoid
(1) (2) (4) (5)
"Decision 1 " represents whether one chooses to drink. "Decision 2" represents
whether one chooses to drive. "Decision 3" represents whether one chooses to
avoid the checkpoint. The three decisions result in six possible outcomes with
221. See id at 1621 ("This Note. ... argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a bright-
line rule that allows police to stop vehicles that attempt to evade checkpoints.").
222. Id at 1642. The bright-line rule may not be so bright. See id at 1633 (noting that "it
is nearly impossible to prove conclusively that someone intended to avoid the police unless that
person confesses"). This Note, however, looks beyond the separate issue of how checkpoint
officers determine whether an individual is in fact fleeing the checkpoint.
223. See id. at 1643 ("Allowing individuals to evade checkpoints both undermines the
effectiveness of the checkpoints and increases the discretion of law enforcement officials.").
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six ultimate utility valuations. Individuals may choose one of the following
options: (1) drink, drive, and avoid; (2) drink, drive, and not avoid; (3) drink
and not drive; (4) not drink, drive, and avoid; (5) not drink, drive, not avoid;
and (6) neither drink nor drive. Each option has a utility value, respectively:
U1, U12, U13, (14, U5~, and U16. With the decision tree in mind, this Note now
responds, in turn, to Patel's argument that motorists who avoid checkpoints
(i) undermine the effectiveness of the checkpoint and (ii) increase the
subjective intrusiveness experienced by motorists who do not evade
checkpoints. 2
First, allowing motorists to conduct otherwise lawful maneuvers does not
significantly undermine the primary objective of the sobriety checkpoint-
general deterrence .225  Recall that sobriety checkpoints do not affect the
decision over whether one chooses to drink.2 Sobriety checkpoints, then, do
not influence rational decision-making at the "Decision 1 " level. Recall further
that sobriety checkpoint effectiveness is measured by its ability to influence a
rational individual not to drive after she chooses to drink; sobriety checkpoints
aim to maximize the utility value of option (3)-(13.227 Thus, when individuals
reach "Decision 3" after choosing to drink and drive, the sobriety checkpoint
has already failed regardless of whether the motorist chooses option (1) or (2).
The per se reasonable suspicion standard does not remedy that failure.
The issue turns to whether the availability of option (1) affects the utility
value of option (3). Are motorists more likely to drink and drive upon
observing that a checkpoint officer may not stop the motorist for attempting to
avoid the checkpoint? Assume that the highest state court has ruled, "A
driver's effort to avoid a checkpoint is not sufficient to justify the stopping of a
vehicle., 2 28 To that end, Patel argues, "At the sight of a checkpoint, the most
rational decision for intoxicated drvers ... would be to turn around and
flee. .. . [T]he checkpoints would only process law-abiding citizens, and the
0. 12 to 1. 5 percent of individuals screened at checkpoints who are usually
arrested would fall to zero."2 29  Patel assumes that option (2) is the least
desirable option. In other words, an individual will always choose option (1)
over (2) given only those two options because:
224. Id
225. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the sobriety checkpoint as a general deterrent).
226. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that the sobriety checkpoint does
not influence one's underlying motivation to drink).
227. See supra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the sobriety checkpoint's effectiveness as a general
deterrent).
228. FLA. HIGHWAY PATROL, supra note 217, at 4.




An individual must likewise choose option (3) over (2) given only those two
options because:
U3> U2
An impaired individual, then, must value option (1) more than option (3) for
option (1) to have an adverse effect on the value of option (3). The availability
of the option to avoid the checkpoint, therefore, affects one's decision not to
drive only to the extent that:
Ut> U3
Now assume that the highest state court overruled its previous decision
and adopted a per se reasonable suspicion rule. Theoretically then,
indiscriminate per se reasonable suspicion reduces the utility value of outcome
(1) to equal the utility value of outcome (2) because impaired drivers cannot
avoid police confrontation under outcomes (1) and (2). Put differently:
U1= U2
The most rational decision, therefore, is outcome (3) if one decides to drink
because: U3> U2; and U3> U1.
Unfortunately, no empirical evidence suggests that motorists are more or
less likely to drink and drive upon observing an attempt to avoid the
checkpoint. Perhaps the better question to ask is: Assuming for argument's
sake that motorists are more likely to drink and drive when they observe that a
checkpoint officer cannot stop the motorist for attempting to avoid the
checkpoint, does the benefit of a per se reasonable suspicion standard outweigh
the cost?
The cost of a per se reasonable suspicion standard is measured by how the
standard diminishes the utility of options (4) and (5). Without per se
reasonable suspicion, sober drivers may choose between options (4) and (5)
freely. In other words, sober drivers have no perceived risk of apprehension
under either option-to avoid or not to avoid-because sober drivers violate no
drunk driving law. A sober driver's decision to avoid the checkpoint, therefore,
depends on other subjective utility calculations .23 0 For example, if a sober
driver prefers to avoid police confrontation, the rational choice is option (4)
over (5) because, with all else considered equal, the utility value of option (4) is
230. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (articulating the theory of man as a rational
utility maximizer in all areas of life).
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greater than the utility value of option (5). Put differently, a sober driver will
avoid the checkpoint when:
U4> U5
Now suppose that a court adopts a per se reasonable suspicion standard.
Per se reasonable suspicion, obviously enough, affects both drunk and sober
drivers. The rule eliminates the utility of option (4) for sober drivers who
prefer to avoid police confrontation because option (4) results in a chase and
detain stop. 231 Sober drivers, then, must choose between chase and detain stops
or checkpoint stops when confronted by a checkpoint at "Decision 3." Per se
reasonable suspicion, however, not only influences but also dictates that
decision because, all else considered equal, chase and detain stops are more
intrusive than checkpoint stops.23 Ptdfeently, the sober driver who prefers
to avoid police confrontation values a checkpoint stop more than a chase and
detain stop, such that:
U4< U5
Per se reasonable suspicion, therefore, punishes the sober driver who wishes to
avoid police confrontation by stripping her of the ability to avoid and rendering
her desire irrational.
Patel, however, describes the consequence of choosing option (4) under
these circumstances as "a brief, nonthreatening investigatory stop."23 3 But
recall the similarities of a chase and detain stop and a roving patrol stop: Both
stops involve the approach of a police vehicle and greater restriction of
23movement. Further, Sitz reiterated the substantive difference between roving
patrol and checkpoint stops:
[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search arefar less
intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach mayfrighten
motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles
are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority', and he
is much less liely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.25
231. See Patel, supra note 20, at 1649 (noting the argument that "per se reasonable
suspicion impermissibily prevents a driver from taking any action that looks evasive").
232. See infra notes 233-234 and accompanying text (distinguishing the subjective
intrusion between a checkpoint stop and a chase and detain stop).
233. Patel, supra note 20, at 1649.
234. See supra note I1I and accompanying text (drawing the comparison between police
stops and fishing).
235. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 4.44, 453 (1990) (emphasis added and
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Recall further that a chase and detain officer subjects the sober driver to
inquiries regarding sobriety. The checkpoint officer, on the other hand, may
not subject the sober driver to sobriety inquiries unless the officer detects any
indicia of intoxication, such as slurred speech, watery or blood shot eyes, and
lack of coordination. Sober drivers, therefore, comply with checkpoint stops
because the consequences of noncompliance outweigh the consequences of
compliance.
The rationale behind conducting sobriety checkpoints as an enforcement
program does not support the need to redefine rational choice for otherwise
innocent individuals. Traditional sobriety checkpoints attempt to influence, not
eliminate, rational choice. For example, the language in federal statutes,
executive publications, and sociological reports all emphasize the
implementation of highly "publicized"' and highly "visible," but not mandatory,
sobriety checkpoints. 3 When executive publications recommend chase and
detain stops, they recommend that officers stop motorists exhibiting erratic
behavior, not mere evasiveness. 3 Per se reasonable suspicion, therefore, is
inconsistent with that literature.
Lastly, per se reasonable suspicion shifts the focus of the sobriety
checkpoint from deterrence to detection, rendering "the initial stop of each
motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary
questioning and observation by checkpoint officers 238 at issue in Sitz an
entirely different creature. The cause of the shift stems from the underlying
misconception that, without per se reasonable suspicion, "the essential
justification for the checkpoint would no longer exist[] because the checkpoint
would no longer serve any legitimate government interest, given that no one
would be caught.0 39 Per se reasonable suspicion, then, offers a remedy. But
deterrence, not detection, is the essential justification for the checkpoint, and a
declining arrest rate may indicate that the sobriety checkpoint is effective
quotations omitted).
236. See, e.g., SAFETEA-LU § 2007(b)(3), 23 U.S.C. § 410(c)(1) (2006) (offering federal
assistance to states that conduct "a series of high visibility, statewide law enforcement
campaigns," including sobriety checkpoints (emphasis added)).
237. The Use of Sobriety Checkpoints for Impaired Driving Enforcement, NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFic SAFETY ADMIN., PUBL'N No. DOT HS 807 656, at A-3 (1990), available at
http://ntl.bts.gov/libf5000/5900/5919/checkpt.pdf ("A motorist who wishes to avoid the
checkpoint by legally turning before entering the checkpoint area should be allowed to do so
unless a traffic violation(s) is observed or probable cause exists to take other action. The act of
avoiding a sobriety checkpoint does not constitute grounds for a stop.").
238. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-51.
239. Patel, supra note 20, at 1644 (emphasis added).
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toward its goal .240 The effect of per se reasonable suspicion results in definite
social costs for unobserved, and most likely unobservable, social benefits.
Even though the fact that benefits are unobservable does not render the
proposal unreasonable, it nevertheless suggests that the proposal is unjustified.
V. Conclusion
This Note is dissatisfied with the Court's interpretation and application of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in Sitz and attempts to provide a better
approach, at least within the narrow scope of sobriety checkpoint
reasonableness. This Note finds useful the principles of economic theory,
supported by empirical evidence, to hypothesize a model and predict the future
of sobriety checkpoint reasonableness. The model overcomes deficiencies in
traditional judicial analysis-namely, broad deference to politically accountable
authorities when evaluating effectiveness and unclear standards when
evaluating the degree of subjective intrusion. The model predicts that at some
point in time-maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow-social costs will
outweigh social benefits. A Sit-type case, therefore, may find itself back
before the Court for a second look at the constitutionality of suspicionless stops
at sobriety checkpoints. In the unlikely event that the Court adopts this
interpretation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, perhaps the Court will
then provide a more justified opinion.
Until the Court revisits the narrow issue of sobriety checkpoint
reasonableness, however, the states will remain split over whether checkpoint
police may chase and detain motorists who exhibit the apparent intention to
avoid the checkpoint but otherwise do not exhibit any articulable traffic
infraction. Some courts have found that the apparent intention to avoid a
checkpoint does not alone provide officers with reasonable suspicion to stop the
avoiding motorist, leading academics to claim that decisions like these
undermine the justification for suspicionless Sitz stops. This Note questions
that claim and finds the benefits of a per se reasonable suspicion standard, at
best, unobserved. The cost of a per se reasonable suspicion standard, however,
is realized by the liberty interest lost upon implementation of such a standard.
For these reasons, courts may best serve aggregate social utility by rejecting a
per se reasonable suspicion standard.
One final point: The sobriety checkpoint is a novel approach to general
deterrence. Undoubtedly, the judicial approval and executive use of sobriety
240. Supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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checkpoints has saved lives. But the benefit in lives saved for a few comes at
the cost of a change in lifestyle for many. Courts, in the end, have the duty to
balance the competing interests objectively. To execute this duty, courts are
best served by employing whichever standard evaluates the competing interests
most accurately. Here, courts should abandon deference and turn to empirical
study because only then will courts have a better understanding of sobriety
checkpoint reasonableness.

